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[L. A. No. 23261. In B~nk. June 27, 1955.] 
THE PACIFIC MU'fUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF CALIFORNIA (a Corporation) et at, Appellants. 
v. F. BRITTON McCONNELL, as Insurance Commis-
sioner, etc., et a!., Respondents. 
[1] Insurance-Incorporated Insurers - Voluntary Mutualization. 
-Essential differences in procedure relating to voluntary 
mutualization of solvent insurer and involuntary mutualiza-
tion of insolvent insurer are that, under statutory provisions 
relating to voluntary mutualization (Ins. Code, § 11525 et seq.), 
plan is adopted by directors subject to approval by stockholders 
and Insurance Commissioner, and no court proceedings are 
necessary; whereas under provisions for involuntary mutual-
ization of seized insurer (Ins. Code, § 1043 et seq.), plan is 
formulated by commissioner as conservator without consent of 
stockholders or directors, and must be approved by court. 
[2a,2b] Id.-Incorporated Insurers - Voluntary Mutualization.-
- Where new life insurance company is organized as part of re-
habilitation of old insolvent company, and is solvent and non-
delinquent, applicable statutory provisions for mutualization 
of new company are Ins. Code, § 11525 et seq., which govern 
voluntary mutualization of solyent nondelinquent insurers. 
[3] Id.-Incorporated Insurers-Powers of Oommissioner as Liq-
uidator.-Insurance Commissioner has power to create new 
corporation in order to preserve business of seized insolvent 
insurer, there being no statutory limitation on his right to 
do such acts, in addition to powers expressly enumerated, as 
he may deem necessary in connection with handling of affairs 
of insolvent company. (See Ins. Code, §§ 1037, 1043.) 
[4] Id.-Incorporated Insurers-Powers of Oommissioner as Liq-
uidator.-When salvaging business of seized insolvent insurer, 
greatest possible protection should be given to creditors and 
other interested parties" and Insurance Commissioner may 
properly conclude that such objective can best be accomplished 
through formation of new company divorced as far as possible 
from control of those who were in charge of old company 
when it experienced financial difficulties. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2,7,19,22-24] Insurance, § 6.5; [3,4, 
20] Insurance, § 11.18; [5, 6] Insurance, § 11.24; [8] Judgments, 
§§ 395,396; [9,13] Insurance, § 11.14; [10] Judgments, § 338; [11] 
Courts, §9: [12,17, 18] Jud~ments, §318: rJ4] Decedents' Estates, 
§1053: [15] Trusts, §358; [16] Judgments, §413; [21] Corpora-
tions, § 580 • 
,0 
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[5] Id.-Incorporated Insurers-Rehabilitation - New Company-
Status.-New life insurance company, organized by Insurance 
Commissioner as part of rehabilitation of old insolvent com· 
pany t is separate and distinct entity, and when business is 
transferred it ceases to be business of old company and be-
01. comes bU!'liness of new company. 
[6] ld.-Incorporated Insurers - Rehabilitation-New Company-
Status.-Fact that new life insurance company, organized by 
Insurance Commissioner as part of rehabilitation of old in-
solvent company, may for some purposes have served as agent 
or instrumentality of commissioner does not destroy its identity 
as separate company. 
[7] Id.-Incorporated Insurers - Voluntary Mutualization.-Fact 
that Insurance Commissioner, acting as conservator of insol-
vent insurance company and as sole holder of stock of new 
solvent company, organized by commissioner as part of re-
habilitation of old company, gave advance consent to a plan 
of mutualization did not disqualify commissioner from passing 
on fairness of the plan which was promUlgated. (Ins. Code, 
§ 11526.) 
[8] Judgments - Res Judicata - Mattera Ooncluded.-Though 
causes of action be different, prior determination of issue is 
conclusive in subsequent suit between same parties as to that 
issue and every matter which might have been urged to sustain 
or defeat its determination. (Disapproving inconsistent lan-
guage in Green v. Green, 66 Ca1.App.2d 50, 59 [151 P.2d 679]; 
Babcock v. Babcock, 63 Cal.App.2d 94, 97 [146 P.2d 279]; 
Bank of America v. McLaughlin, 22 Cal.App.2d 411, 417 [72 
P.2d 554].) .; 01 
[9a, 9b] Insurance - Incorporated Insurers - Rehabilitation and 
Agreements Therefor.-Order of court approving agreement 
for rehabilitation of insolvent life insurance company by or-
ganizing new solvent life insurance company is conclusive as 
to such agreement and plan for mutualization of new company 
in subsequent mandamus proceeding by old company and its 
stockholders to review action of Insurance Commissioner ap. 
proving mutualization plan, even if mutualization was accom-
plished under wrong statute, where basic issue before court 
when agreement was submitted for approval was propriety 
of each of its provisions, including such plan, and there was 
nothing which prevented questions with regard to validity of 
such agreement from being litigated. 
[10] Judgments-Res Judicata.-Generally, a final judgment or 
order is res judicata even though contrary to statute, where 
[8] See Cal.Jm .. Judgments, §§ 190, 193; Am.Jur. Judgments, 
I§ 178,l8l. 
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court has jurisdiction in fundamental sense, i.e., of subject 
matter and parties. 
[11] Courts-Jurisdiction.-There is difference between lack of 
jurisdiction in fundamental sense, which is ordinarily essential 
for collateral attack, and broader meaning of term "lack of 
jurisdiction" when used in determining availability of prohibi-
tion or certiorari to review order or judgment. 
[12] Judgments - Collateral Attack - Want of Jurisdiction.-In 
some instances requirements of statute may relate to subject 
matter jurisdiction, and disregard of statute may render judg-
ment void and subject to collateral attack. 
(18] Insurance-Incorporated Insurers-Rehabilitation and Agree-
ments Therefor.-Where court which approved agreement for 
rehabilitation of insolvent insurance company by organizing 
new solvent company and providing plan for mutualization 
of new company had jurisdiction of subject matter and parties, 
unless case comes within some exception collateral attack 
cannot be based on ground that courJ authorized mutualization 
to proceed under wrong statute. 
[14] Decedents' Estates-Distribution-Decree-Conclusiveness.-
Probate decrees are res judicata, though they direct distribu-
tion pursuant to wills which are contrary to statute, since 
court sitting in probate is under duty to determine validity 
of instrument before it. 
[16] Trusts - Accounting - Proceedings - Conclusiveness.-An 
order settling trustee's account is res judicata as to propriety 
of purchase of innstment certificates which were issued con-
trary to statute. (Disapproving Estate of Rowe, 66 Cal.App. 
2d 594 [152 P.2d 765].) 
[16] Judgments-Res Judicata--Issues Relating to Contracts.-
Judgments enforcing contracts are bar to defense of illegality 
in subsequent litigation. 
[1'1] Id.-Collateral Attack-Want of Jurisdiction.-A judgment 
contrary to statute may be collaterally attacked though court 
had fundamental jurisdiction where unusual circumstances 
were present which prevented earlier and more appropriate 
attack. 
[18] Id.-Collateral Attack-Want of Jurisdiction.-Proceedings 
to prohibit or annul judgments of contempt for violation of 
injunctions and other equitable orders made contrary to statute 
constitute permissible forms of collateral attack. 
[19] Insurance-Incorporated Insurers-Voluntary Mutualization. 
-In absence of statutory provision to contrary, stockhold~rs 
of solvent company can contract to consent to future plan of 
voluntary mutualization, and such agreement is not improper 
merely because shares are held by Insurance Commissioner as 
eoDael"Vator of aeiud insolvent insurez. 
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[20] Id.-Incorporated Insurers-Powers of Commissioner as Liq-
uidator.-Powers vested in Insurance Commissioner by Ins. 
Code, §§ 1037, 1043, relating to insolvent insurers, are suffi-
ciently broad to authorize him, as sole stockholder of seized 
o. 
insurer, to give advance consent to plan of mutualization for 
new solvent company. 
[21] Corporations-Omeera-Powers of Directors.-Direotors must 
ordinarily act on advice of corporate officers and other persons 
who have expert knowledge. 
[22] Insurance - Incorporated Insurers - Voluntary Mutualiza-
tion.-Where Insurance Commissioner's approval of plan for 
mutualization of new solvent insurance company did not involve 
deprivation of property rights or vested rights, but was in 
essence permit or license authorizing new company to purchase 
its own stock, function of superior court was to determine 
whether action taken by commissioner was arbitrary or con-
stituted abuse of discretion, and in upholding action of com-
missioner it properly refused to conduct trial de novo. 
[2S] Id.-Incorporated Insurers - Voluntary Mutualization.-In-
surance Commissioner's approval of plan for mutualization of 
new solvent insurance company is sustained by testimony of 
experts highly skilled in matters of insurance company valua-
tion that price fixed for purchase of stock was fair, that pro-
visions relating to time and manner of payment were necessary 
for safety and stability of new company, and that such plan 
gave due regard and protection to rights of all persons in-
terested in new company and would be fair in its operation. 
[24] Id. - Incorporated Insurers - Voluntary Mutualization.-
Claim that insolvent life insurance company and its stock-
holders were denied procedural due process by Insurance Com-
missioner's acceptance of conclusions of price determination 
committee with reference to mutualization plan for new sol-
vent life insurance compnny without having before him all 
facts on which those conclusions were based, and by fact that 
committee itself relied on statistics furnished by its actuary 
without reviewing all supporting data, is unsupported where 
two of four members of such committee testified in detail as 
to how committee arrived at its determinations, and actuary 
testified regarding his report which was introduced in evidence, 
and where these witnesses, who were available for cross-
examination, were experts in insurance and investment fields, 
the fact that other members of committee who assisted actuary 
were not called as witnt:t;ses being immaterial in absence of 
sbowing that old company and its stockholders sought their 
testimony. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Loa 
.A.n&eles County. Paul Nourse, Judge. Affirmed. 
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Proceeding in mandamus to review action of Insurance 
Commissioner in approving play! for mutualization of an in-
surance company. Judgment denying -vrit affirmed. 
Joseph L. Lewinson, Frank B. Belcher, C. Ray Robinson, 
Melvin, Faulkener, Sheehan & Wiseman, Henry W. Low and 
William B. Boone for Appellants. 
C. Ray Robinson and William B. Boone, as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Appellants. 
O'Melveny & Myers, Paul Fussell, Homer I. Mitchell, James 
E. Cross, George B. Gose, Frank P. Doherty, Guy Knupp and 
Peery Price for Respondents. 
Lloyd W. Dinkelspiel and Heller, Ehrman, White & Mc-
Auliffe, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents. 
GIBSON, C. J.-The Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany of California (hereinafter referred to as the "old 
company") and certain of its stockholders brought this man-
damus proceeding in the superior court to review the action 
of the Insurance Commissioner in approving a plan for mu-
tualization of a second corporation, Pacific Mutual Life 
Insurance Company (hereinafter called the "new company"), 
which had been organized by the commissioner as part of 
the rehabilitation of the old company. The court upheld the 
action of the commissioner, and plaintiffs have appealed from 
the judgment. 
In 1936 the old company was in a hazardous and insolvent 
condition within the meaning of the Insurance Code, and its 
business and assets were taken over by the Insurance Commis-
sioner,· as authorized by statute. (Ins. Code, §§ 1011, 1013.) 
Pursuant to section 1043 of the code, a rehabilitation agree-
ment was entered into between the new company and Com-
missioner Carpenter, as conservator of the old company, 
whereby most of its assets were transferred to the new com-
pany in exchange for all the new company's capital stock. 
The stock was to be held by the commissioner as conservator 
for the benefit of the creditors, policyholders and stockholders 
of the old company. The new company assumed substantially 
·Six successive commissioners, Messrs. Carpenter, Goodcell, Caminetti, 
Garrison, Downey and Maloney, have passed upon matters relatin~ to 
the insolvency of the old company. 
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all the obligations of the old company, including a limited 
obligation with respect to noncancellable accident and health 
policies (referred to herein as " non-can policies") , and 
agreed to set up a special fund for restoration of benefits to 
holders of those policies. 
In December 1936, after a hearing, the superior court 
approved the rehabilitation agreement and authorized the 
commissioner to perform all the obligations required on his 
part. This order was affirmed in Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. 
L. Ins. Co., 10 Ca1.2d 307 [74 P.2d 761]. (Affd. in NebleU 
v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297 [59 S.Ct. 170, 83 L.Ed. 182].) In 
February 19377 an order was made providing for the liquida-
tion of the old company and appointing the commissioner 
as liquidator. It was upheld in Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. 
L. Ins. Co., 13 Ca1.2d 306 [89 P .2d 637]. In 1938 the commis-
sioner transferred the stock of the new company to five trustees 
who were given legal title to the stock with power to vote it 
in accordance with the purposes of the rehabilitation agree-
ment. The order approving the transfer was affirmed in Cam-
inetti v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 22 Ca1.2d 344 [139 P.2d 908]. 
The rehabilitation agreement set forth the method by which 
a plan for mutualization of the new company could be formu-
lated. It pro'vided that 10 per cent of the participating life 
policyholders eould request the new company to create an 
appointing committee consisting of the president of the Lifa 
Insurance Association of America. the president of Stanford 
University and the provost of the University of California at 
Los Angeles. The appointing committee was directed to select 
a price determination committee composed of persons skilled 
in matters of insurance company valuation. If the price 
determination committee concluded that voluntary mutualiza-
tion could be practicably accomplished, it was to propose a 
plan of mutualization in accordance with the laws of this 
state. By the terms of the agreement the commissioner, as 
sole shareholder of the new company, consented in advance 
to the plan of mutualization to be formulated. 
A price determination committee was appointed, consisting 
of Alva J. McAndless, president of the Lincoln National Life 
Insurance Company of Fort Wayne, Indiana; Horace R. Bass-
ford, vice president and chief actuary of the Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Company of New York; Ray D. Murphy, vice 
president and chief actuary of the Equitable Life Assurance 
Society of New York; and AlbC'rt J. Hettinger, a partner in 
Lazard Freres and Company, a firm engaged in investment 
) 
-.'" -- ,.'. 
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banking. After three years of study the committee proposed 
a plan of mutualization, which provides that, upon the occur-
rence of certain conditions, the' new company shall buy all 
of its own capital stock for $3,000,000, plus interest from 
December 31, 1948, the price to be augmented should the 
restoration of benefits under the non-can policies be completed 
before 1973. 
The proposed plan of mutualization was adopted by the 
directors of the new company on May 5, 1950. On September 
22, 1950, after a hearing, Commissioner Downey approved 
the plan, finding that it would be fair and equitable in its 
operation, and thereafter it was approved by the policyholders 
of the new company. This proceeding in mandamus was 
then brought to review the action of the commissioner, and 
the trial court concluded that there was substantial evidence 
to support his findings and that he had not exceeded his juris-
diction or abused his discretion in approving the plan. 
Plaintiffs attack the judgment upon numerous grounds, and, 
although many of their contentions may be disposed of by 
application of principles of res judicata, we believe that the 
problems may be more clearly presented by first discussing 
the propriety of the determination of the various points with-
out regard to the binding effect of prior adjudications. 
The first problem which we must consider is whether the 
proper statutes were followed in the formulation and approval 
of the mutualization plan. As contemplated by the rehabilita-
tion agreement, all steps in connection with the adoption of 
the plan were taken pursuant to sections 11525 et seq. of 
the Insurance Code, which relate to voluntary mutualization 
of a solvent insurer.- Plaintiffs assert that the applicable 
statutes for mutualization of the new company are sections 
1043 et seq., which govern involuntary mutualization of an 
insolvent insurer. t [1] The essential differences in procedure 
-Section 11525 of the Insurance Code provides: H A solvent domestic 
incorporated insurer having a paid-in capital represented by outstanding 
shares of capital stock and issuing, on a reserve basis, nonassessable 
policies of life insurance or of both life and disability insurance, may 
convert itself into an incorporated mutual life insurer, or life and dis-
ability insurer, issuing nonassessable policies on a reserve basis. '1'0 that 
end it may provide and carry out a plan for the acquisition of the out-
standing shares of its capital stock for the benefit of its policyholders, 
or any class or classes of its policyholders, by complying with the require-
ments of this chapter." 
Sections 11526-11533 contain detailed provisions relating to procedure 
for adoption and execution of the plan of mutualization. 
tSection 1043 of the Insurance Code provides in part: "In any 
po~odin& 1.1Dde.r ibM ari;icle. ihe commiisioner, .. ~ or .. 
) 
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are that under the sections relating to voluntary mutualization 
of a solvent company the plan is adopted by the directors. 
subject to approval by the stockholders and the commissioner, 
and no court proceedings are necessary; whereas under the 
Wovisions for involuntary mutualization of a seized insurer 
the plan is formulated by the commissioner as conservator 
without consent of the stockholders or directors, and it must 
be approved by the court. 
[2a] The new company is solvent and nondelinquent, and 
there is no sound reason why it should be mutualized under 
the statutes relating to insolvent insurers. [8] The com-
missioner bad power to create the new corporation in order 
to preserve the business of the seized insurer. Section 1043. 
which authorizes the commissioner to enter into rehabilitation 
agreements, contains no express limitation on what may be 
included in them, and section 1037 provides that the enumera-
tion of the powers of the commissioner shall not be construed 
as a limitation upon him or upon his right to do such other 
acts as he may deem necessary in connection with the handling 
of the affairs of an insolvent company.- [4] When sal-
vaging the business of a seized insurer the greatest possible 
protection should be given to creditors and other interested 
parties, and in the present instance the commissioner evidently 
concluded that this objective could best be accomplished 
through the formation of a new company divorced as far as 
possible from the control of those who were in charge of 
the old company when it experienced financial difficulties. 
[5] The new company is a separate and distinct entity, 
and when the business was transferred it ceased to be the 
liquidator, may, subject to the approval of said court, and subject to 
such liens as may be necessary mutualize or reinsure the business of 
such person, or enter into rehabilitation agreements." The words" such 
person" include an insolvent insurer as referred to in sections 1010 
et seq. of the Insurance Code dealing with insolvency and delinquency. 
Section 1045 provides: "If at any time after the issuance of an 
order under section 1011 .•. it shall appear to the commissioner that 
the purposes of section 1011 can be best attained by the mutualization 
of such life insurer, the commissioner may formulate a plan for the 
mutualization of such insurer." Section 1046 et seq. set forth the 
necessary procetlural steps. 
·Section 1037 of the Insurance Code provides in part: "The enumera-
tion, in this article, of the duties, powers and authority of the com-
missioner in proceedings under this article shall not be construed as a 
limitation upon the commissioner, nor shall it exclude in any manner 
his right to perform and to do such other acts not herein specifically 
enumerated, or otherwise prodded for, which he may deem necessary 
or expedient for the accomplishment or in aid of the purpose of 8UCh 
proeeedinKs.' , 
\ 
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business of the old company and became the business of the 
new company. In Garrison v. Pacific Mitt. L. Ins. 00., 83 
Cal.App.2d 1, 9-10 [187 P.2d 893}, it was held that the identity 
of the new company "is utterly distinct from that of old 
company," that it "cannot be fairly said that it is a continu-
ance of old company," and that the new company "is a 
separate entity that came into being after old company's 
insolvency was declared. . . ." [6] The fact that the new 
company may for some purposes have served as an agent or 
instrumentality of the commissioner does not destroy its 
identity as a separate company. [2b] Accordingly, as oon-
templated by the rehabilitation agreement, the applicable stat-
utory provisions for mutualization of the new company are 
those found in section 11525 et seq., which govern voluntary 
mutualization of solvent nondelinquent insurers. 
[7] Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that it was improper 
to follow the procedure set up in the code for mutualization 
of a solvent company because, they assert, the commissioner 
in doing so was forced to act in a dual capacity with conflicting 
interests. Section 11526, which prescribes the method to be 
followed in mutualizing a solvent insurer, provides that the 
plan shall be: ". • • (b) Approved by the vote of the 
holders of at least a majority of the outstanding shares at a 
special meeting of shareholders called for that purpose, or 
by the written consent of such shareholders. (c) Submitted 
to the commissioner and approved by him in writing." Com-
missioner Carpenter as the sole holder of the stock of the 
new company consented in advance to the plan of mutualiza-
tion, and Commissioner Downey approved it after holding a 
hearing to ascertain if the plan would be fair and equitable 
in its operation. Plaintiffs claim that the responsibilities of 
the commissioner under subdivision ( c) are different from 
and may conflict with his duties under subdivision (b). Even 
if there might be such a conflict under some circumstances, 
it would not follow that it was improper to adopt the statutory 
procedure set forth for the mutualization of a solvent com-
pany. The legislative scheme for the mutualization of solvent 
nondelinquent insurers would in some instances be defeated 
if the commissioner were disqualified for the reasons urged 
by plaintiffs, and it must be assumed that the Legislature 
realized that the commissioner might be required to pass upon 
the fairness of a plan in a case where he, acting as conservator, 
had previously consented to mutualization on behalf of the 
stockholders. In numerous cases where the action of an admin-
) 
) 
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istrative officer was necessary to prevent defeat of the statutory 
scheme, his participation has been upheld, although th~ 
grounds for disqualification were much more serious than those 
raised here. (For example, see Thompson v. Oity of Long 
Beach, 41 Ca1.2d 235, 243-244 [259 P.2d 649] ; Oaminetti v. 
Pacific Mut. L. I1zs. 00., 22 Ca1.2d 344, 365-366 [139 P.2d 
908] ; Federal Oonst. 00. v. Ourd, 179 Cal. 489, 493-495 [177 
P. 469, 2 A.L.R. 1202]; Scannell v. Wolff, 86 Cal.App.2d 
489, 492-493 [195 P.2d 536] ; Nider v. Homan, 32 Cal.App.2d 
11, 13 [89 P.2d 136].) The fact that Commissioner Carpenter 
gave advance consent on behalf of the stockholders to a plan 
of mutualization did not disqualify Commissioner Downey 
from passing upon the fairness of the mutualization plan. 
which was promulgated. 
An alternative reason for rejecting plaintiffs' claim that it 
was improper to follow the procedure set forth in sections 
11525 et seq. in the mutualization of the new company is 
that the validity of the rehabilitation agreement, which pro-
vided for voluntary mutualization, is now res judicata. A 
copy of the agreement was attached to and made a part of 
the petition which sought approval of the agreement. The 
petition was filed pursuant to section 1043, which provides 
that rehabilitation agreements entered into by the commis-
sioner are subject to the approval of the superior court. The 
validity of all the provisions of the agreement was put in 
issue by the petition and determined by the court. The order 
of December 4, 1936, approved the agreement "and each and 
all of the terms and conditions thereof, and the plan therein 
embodied," reciting that all interested parties had been given 
a reasonable opportunity to be heard on "the question of 
fairness, justice, equity, feasibility, and propriety" of the 
agreement and the plan. All parties were forever enjoined 
from making any complaint with respect to the agreement 
or any provisions thereof. This order was affirmed in Car-
penter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 10 Cal.2d 307 [74 P.2d 761]. 
(See also Oarpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins 00., 13 Cal.2d 306, 
314-316 [89 P.2d 637] ; Oaminetti v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 
22 Cal.2d 344, 351-352 [139 P.2d 908].) 
[8] While ditIerent causes of action were involved in the 
present proceeding and the one leading to the order approv-
ing the rehabilitation agreement, the parties were the same, 
and it is settled that even though the causes of action be 
different, the prior determination of an issue is conclusive 
iII. a subsequent suit between the same parties as to that issue 
) 
) 
/' 
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and every matter which might have been urged to sustain 
or defeat its determination. (Shore v. Shore, 43 Ca1.2d 677. 
682 [277 P.2d 400] ; Krier v. Kt'ier, 28 Ca1.2d 841, 843 [172 
P.2d 681] ; De Hart v. Allen, 26 Ca1.2d 829, 831 [161 P.2d 
453]; Estate of Keet, 15 Ca1.2d 328, 334 [100 P.2d 1045]: 
Sutphin v. Speik, 15 Ca1.2d 195, 201 et seq. [99 P.2d 652. 
101 P.2d 497] ; Carninetti v. Board of Trustees, 1 Ca1.2d 354, 
356 [34 P.2d 1021] ; Price v. Sixth District Ag1'i. Assn., 201 
Cal. 502, 510 et seq. [258 P. 387].) Inconsistent language 
found in certain opinions of the District Court of Appeal 
must be disapproved. (Green v. Green, 66 Cal.App.2d 50, 59 
[151 P.2d 679] ; Babcock v. Babcock, 63 Cal.App.2d 94, 97 
[146 P.2d 279] ; Bank of America v. McLaughlin, 22 Cal.App. 
2d 411, 417 [71 P.2d 291, 72 P.2d 554].) [9a] The basic 
issue before the court when the agreement was submitted for 
approval was the propriety of each of its provisions, and 
the determination of that issue is conclusive as to every matter 
which might have been urged to sustain or defeat its deter-
mination. 
. It is contended that the order approving the rehabilitation 
agreement may be collaterally attacked upon the theory that 
the mutualization procedure provided for in the agreement 
followed the wrong statutory provisions and that therefore 
the order is void. For the purpose of passing upon this ques-
tion we shall assume, contrary to what we have just decided, 
that the wrong statutes were used in the mutualization of 
the new company. 
[10] It is the general rule that a final judgment or order 
is res judicata even though contrary to statute where the 
court has jurisdiction in the fundamental sense, i. e., of the 
subject matter and the parties. [11] In the consideration 
of problems arising in this field it should be kept in mind 
that there is a difference between lack of jurisdiction in the 
fundamental sense, which is ordinarily essential for collateral 
attack, and the broader meaning of the term "lack of juris-
diction" when used in determining the availability of prohibi-
tion or certiorari to review an order or judgment. Some cases 
involving collateral attack have unfortunately failed to recog-
nize this distinction. (For discussion of the distinction, see 
Abelleira v. District' Court of Appeal, 17 Ca1.2d 280, 287-291 
[109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715] ; Tide lVater Assoc. O'll boo 
v. Superior Court, 43 Ca1.2d 815, 821 [279 P.2d 35]) 
[12] In some instances the requirements of a statute may 
relate to subject matter jurisdicti(\n, and disregard of the 
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statute may render a judgment void and subject to collateral 
attack. (See, for example, Grannis v. Superior Court, 146 
Cal. 245, 254-255 [79 P. 891, 106 Am.St.Rep. 23] ; cf. Rogers 
v. Oady, 104 Cal. 288, 291-292 [38 P. 81, 43 Am.St.Rep. 100] 
.[ constitutional provision].) [13] In the present case, how-
ever, it is clear that the court which approved the rehabilita-
tion agreement had jurisdiction of the subject matter and 
the parties, and, unless the case comes within some exception, 
collateral attack cannot be based on the ground that the court 
authorized mutualization to proceed under the wrong statute. 
[14] Closely analogous to the problem involved here are 
cases holding that probate decrees are res judicata, althougb 
they direct distribution pursuant to wills which are contrary 
to statute, since the court sitting in probate, like a court 
passing upon a rehabilitation agreement, is under a duty to 
determine the validity of the instrument before it. (Estat8 
of Loring, 29 Ca1.2d 423, 427 et seq. [175 P.2d 524] ; Orew v. 
Pratt, 119 Cal. 139, 147 at seq. [51 P. 38] ; Estate of Gardiner, 
45 Cal.App.2d 559, 562 et seq. [114 P.2d 643] ; McGavin v. 
San Francisco P.O.A. Soc., 34 Cal.App. 168, 170 et seq. [167 
P. 182].) [15] Similarly analogous are cases holding that 
an order settling a trustee's account is res judicata as to the 
propriety of the purchase of investment certificates which 
were issued contrary to statute. (W~"Zlson v. Security-First 
Nat. Bank, 21 Ca1.2d 705 [134 P.2d 800] ; Estate of Orane, 
73 Cal.App.2d 93 l165 P.2d 940] ; cf. Fergodo v. Donohue, 
40 Cal.App. 670 [181 P. 819].) Estats of Rowe, 66 Cal. 
App.2d 594 [152 P.2d 765], which is contrary to the cases 
cited above, is disapproved. 
[16] The principle of res judicata has also been applied 
as a basis for holding that judgments enforcing contracts 
are a bar to the defense of illegality in subsequent litigation. 
(.t11ldrews v. Re·idy, 7 Ca1.2d 366 [60 P.2d 832] ; De Hart v. 
Allen, 49 Cal.App.2d 639, 646 [122 P.2d 273], approved in 
De Hart v. Allen, 26 Ca1.2d 829, 830-831 [161 P.2d 453]; 
cf. Short v. Short, 106 Cal.App. 210, 215 [288 P. 1111].) 
Another instance in which the doctrine was applied is San 
Diego Trust &- Sav. Banlc v. Young, 19 Ca1.2d 98 [119 P.2d 
133], where the prior judgment reduced the time for redemp-
tion contrary to statute. The San Diego case impliedly over-
ruled Anthony v . • Janssen, ]83 Cal. 329 [191 P. 538], and 
Tonnil1gsen v. Odd Fellows' Ocmetcry .. issn., 60 Cal.App. 
568 [213 P. 710]. It has also been held that a judgment, 
which was contrary to the Constitution because it was based 
'j 
I 
i 
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upon a statute later held invalid, was nevertheless res judicata 
in a subsequent suit, the court stating that objections to the 
statute should have been raise,d in the prior proceeding. 
(Chicot Co·unty Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 
U.S. 371, 376, 378 [60 8. Ct. 317, 319-320, 84 L.Ed. 329].) 
The Chi cot case is quoted with approval in Mueller v. Elba 
Oil Co., 21 Ca1.2d 188, 205-206 [130 P.2d 961], and was cited 
in Rescue Army v. Municipal COU1"t, 28 Ca1.2d 460, 463-464 
[171 P.2d 8]. 
There are some recognized exceptions to the general rule 
that collateral attack will not be allowed where there is funda-
mental jurisdiction even though the judgment is contrary to 
statute. [17] For example, a judgment may be collaterally 
attacked where unusual circumstances were present which 
prevented an earlier and more appropriate attack. (See 1 
Witkin, California Procedure (1954), 411-412.) In B-urtnett 
v. King, 33 Ca1.2d 805 [205 P.2d 657, 12 A.L.R.2d 333], 
collateral attack was permitted against a default divorce 
decree which awarded all the community property to the 
plaintiff in the absence of a prayer therefor in the complaint, 
contrary to the provision in section 580 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure that relief in a default case cannot exceed that 
demanded in the complaint. The defendant in the divorce 
action had no notice or warning that the property would be 
affected by a default judgment, and the opinion points out 
that the decision would sanction a trap if it held that his 
property rights had been disposed of since he would properly 
have assumed from the complaint that his rights to the prop-
erty were not to be litigated at that time. (33 Ca1.2d at p. 
811.) The present case is readily distinguishable, since there 
was nothing to prevent the questions which are raised with 
regard to the validity of the rehabilitation agreement from 
being litigated in the proceedings which led to the order 
approving the agreement. 
[18] Proceedings to prohibit or annul judgments of con-
tempt for violation of injunctions and other equitable orders 
made contrary to statute may constitute another exception to 
the general rule. (Ha1'lan v. Superior Court, 94 Cal.App.2d 
902, 904-905 [211 P.2d 942] ; Hunter v. Superior COU1't, 36 
Cal.App.2d 100 [97 P.2d 492]; ct. Fortenbury v. Superior 
Court, 16 Ca1.2d 405, 407-408 [l06 P.2d 411] [violation of 
Constitution].) The decisions do not use the term, but 
the attaek in such cases might be considered to be collateral, 
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and the proceedings apparently fall in a special category 
because they are penal in nature. 
[9b] From the foregoing discussion it follows that, even 
if we assume that the rehabilitation agreement and the order 
approving it authorized mutualization of the new company 
unt[er the wrong statutes, the order is nevertheless res judicata. 
The next problem is whether there was sufficient compliance 
with the statutory requirements for voluntary mutualization 
of solvent insurers. Sections 11525 et seq. provide. that the 
plan of mutualization shall be adopted by the directors and 
approved by the shareholders, the commissioner and the policy-
holders. Plaintiffs contend that the actions taken to meet 
these requirements were in certain respects defective and 
unauthorized. 
The approval of the shareholders to the plan of mutualiza-
tion was given in the rehabilitation agreement by Commis-
sioner Carpenter as sole stockholder of the new company. As 
we have seen, the agreement provided for the formulation of 
a plan of mutualization by the price determination committee, 
and plaintiffs claim that the commissioner, acting for the 
shareholders of the new company, was without authority to 
give advance consent to such a plan. [19] In the absence 
of statutory provision to the contrary, the stockholders of a 
solvent company can contract to consent to a future plan 
of voluntary mutualization (cl. Market St. Ry. 00. v. Hell-
man, 109 Cal. 571, 586-587 [42 P. 225]), and no sound reason 
appears why such an agreement is improper merely because 
the shares are held by the commissioner as conservator of 
a seized insurer. The commissioner apparently concluded that 
a plan for mutualization which could not be destroyed by 
future action or nonaction of the shareholders was necessary 
as a means of inducing both former and prospective policy-
holders to deal with the new company and thus permit its 
continned e-ristence. [201 The nowers vested in the com-
to autfiorize him, as s01e stoclillolaer, to give aavance consen~ 
to the plan of mutualization. Moreover, the validity of all 
portions of the rehabilitation agreement, including the provi-
sion for advance consent, is res judicata. 
The directors adopted the mutualization plan, but it is 
claimed that the action taken was ineffective because they 
assertedly did not obtain sufficient information to enable them 
to properly evaluate the desirability of the plan. [21] They 
had the benefit of the report of the price determination com-
I 
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mittee and the opinions of experts, including actuaries and 
officers of the company, and it seems obvious that, as a prac-
tical matter, directors must ordinarily act on the advice of 
corporate officers and other persons who have expert knowl-
edge. (See Ballantine & Sterling, California Corporation 
Laws (1949), p. 110.) 
After the directors adopted the plan as formulated by 
the price determination committee, Commissioner Downey 
held a hearing which lasted nearly three weeks. Oral and 
documentary evidence was received, and all interested parties 
had an opportunity to participate. The commissioner ap-
proved the plan after finding that the rights and interests 
of the new company, its policyholders and shareholders were 
protected and that the plan would be fair and equitable in 
its operation. Plaintiffs contend that the findings are not 
supported by the evidence and that there was a lack of pro-
cedural due process at the hearing. In passing upon these 
contentions, we shall first give consideration to plaintiffs' 
claim that the trial court, in reviewing the action of the com-
missioner, should have held a trial de novo. [22] The 
approval of the mutualization plan by the commissioner did 
not involve any deprivation of property rights or vested 
rights; it was in essence a permit or license authorizing the 
new company to purchase its own stock. Under these circum-
stances the function of the superior court was to determine 
whether the action taken by the commissioner was arbitrary 
or constituted an abuse of discretion, and in upholding the 
action of the commissioner, it properly refused to conduct a 
trial de novo. (Southern Calif. Jockey Club, Inc. v. California 
etc. Racing Board, 36 Ca1.2d 167, 174-175 [223 P.2d 1J; 
McDonough v. Goodcell, 13 Ca1.2d 741, 746-749 [91 P.2d 1035, 
123 A...L.R. 12051 ; see Thomas v. California Emp. Stab. Com., 
[23] There is llU merit in plaintiftr;: claim trJ.al tIl!; rl~corQ 
before the commissioner does not support his approval of the 
plan. The price determination committee consisted of men 
highly skilled in matters of insurance company valuation, 
and they were assisted in the formulation of the plan by 
Joseph Christman, associate actuary of the Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company of New York, two Fellows of the Society 
of Actuaries, and numerous trained supervisory and clerical 
employees. Experts testified that the price fixed for the 
purchase of the stock was fair, that the provisions relating 
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to the time and manner of payment were necessary for the 
safety and stability of the new company, that the proposed 
plan gave due regard and protection to the rights of all persons 
interested in the new company and would be fair in its 
operation. 
", [24] Plaintiffs' contention that there was a denial of pro-
cedural due process is based on their claim that the commis-
sioner accepted the conclusions of the price determination 
committee without having before him all the facts on which 
those conclusions were based and that the committee itself 
relied on statistics furnished by its actuary without reviewing 
all the supporting data. Two members of the price deter-
mination committee testified in detail as to how the committee 
arrived at its determinations, and the actuary testified regard-
ing his report which was introduced in evidence. Thus two 
of the four members of the committee who were responsible 
for its report, as well as the actuary who procured most of 
the data relied on by the committee, were available for cross-
examination. These men, as we have seen, were experts in 
the insurance and investment fields, and the fact that the 
other members of the committee and the persons who assisted 
the actuary were not called as witnesses is immaterial, at 
least in the absence of a showing that plaintiffs sought to 
obtain their testimony. (City of Pasadena v. City of Alham-
bra, 33 Ca1.2d 908, 919 [207 P.2d 17].) At the hearing an 
offer was made to furnish the documents and testimony neces-
sary to explain every detail of the committee's work. No 
claim is made that any request for data was refused, and 
plaintiffs have no valid basis for complaint if they failed 
to make such a request. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Spence, J., and Wood (Fred B.), J. pro tem.,. 
concurred. 
TRA YNOR, J.-I dissent. 
Although the Legislature has provided detailed statutory 
provisions for the mutualization of the business of an insolvent 
insurer (Ins. Code, § 1045 et seq.), the majority opinion holds 
in effect that these provisions may be completely nullified 
by the execution of a rehabilitation agreement under section 
1043 of the Insurance Code, if such agreement provides for 
the voluntary mutualization of a new insurer created for 
• A Hiped Iv Ohai.rma.n of Judicial Council. 
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the purpose of carrying on the business of the old. The 
commissioner has broad powers in executing rehabilitation 
agreements, and it may be both proper and desirable for 
him to make use of a new corporate entity to salvage the 
business of an insolvent insurer. It does not follow, however, 
that if the end product of a rehabilitation agreement is to 
be the mutualization of the business of an insolvent insurer, 
the statutory provisions with respect to such mutualization 
may be ignored. To hold that they may be not only renders 
the provisions with respect to involuntary mutualization 
superfluous but deprives the interested parties of their right 
to the protection of court scrutiny of the plan of mutualization. 
(See Ins. Code, § 1051.) 
The importance to the shareholders of the old company 
of having the court independently pass upon the fairness of 
the plan of mutualization is demonstrated by the facts of this 
case. The trial court clearly indicated that had the decision 
been his, the plan would not have been approved i if the 
shareholders were entitled to his independent judgment, their 
rights have been prejudiced by his failure to exercise it. 
This case is not one involving only the mutualization of a 
solvent insurer, since if it were, the shareholders would have 
the power to protect their interests by withholding their 
consent to the plan of mutualization. (Ins. Cod~, § 11526, 
subd. (b).) In fact, the business of an insolvent insurer 
is being mutualized pursuant to a rehabilitation agreement 
that has deprived the shareholders of the old company of 
the veto power they otherwise would have, and under the 
holding of the majority opinion they must look to the com-
missioner rather than to the court for the protection of their 
interests. (Ins. Code, §§ 11526, subd. (c), 11527.) Although 
the Legislature recognized that approval by the commissioner 
is sufficient when all of the interested parties are in a posi-
tion to protect their own interests, it also provided that court 
approval is essential when they are not. (Ins. Code, § 1051.) 
Despite the force of the foregoing considerations, if in fact 
the trial court in 1936 approved a rehabilitation agreement 
that not only provided for mutualization contrary to the 
statutory provisions but also restricted the power of that 
court to control the ultimate disposition of the assets in the 
hands of the commissioner as conservator or liquidatbr, I 
would reluctantly concur in the judgment on the ground that 
the validity of the agreement and order is res judicata. In 
my opinion, however, the court in 1936 did not exhaust its 
) 
j 
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power to control the disposition of assets in the hands of the 
commissioner as conservator or liquidator (se'd Ins. Code, 
§ 1037, subd. (d» and that therefore the commissioner cannot 
carry out the terms of the mutualization agreement until as 
liquidator he has secured the permission of the court in the 
"insolvency proceedings. Accordingly, until he secures that 
approval he cannot approve the plan presented by the price 
determination committee as "fair and equitable in its oper-
ation" (Ins. Code, § 11527), for it cannot be known whether 
it will become operative at all until it is approved by the 
court in the insolvency proceedings. 
Subdivision Cd) of section 1037 provides "that no trans-
action involving real or personal property shall be made where 
the market value of the property involved exceeds the sum 
of one thousand dollars without first obtaining permission 
01 . • • [the court in the insolvency proceedings], and then 
only in accordance with such terms as said court may pre-
scribe. " The stock of the new company subject to the plan 
of mutualization is personal property worth more than $1.000, 
and that plan is clearly a transaction involving &uch property. 
This section has not been complied with unless the court in 
approving the rehabilitation agreement granted permission 
to the commissioner to dispose of the stock under the terms 
of any mutualization agreement that might be proposed by 
the price determination committee 10 years or more in the 
future. 
The order approving the rehabilitation agreement is am-
biguous. Paragraph 15 provides: 
"That the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Cali-
fornia as Conservator of respondent corporation, or, if he 
should hereafter be appointed J.Jiquidator of said corporation, 
as such Liquidator, be and is hereby authorized, without 
further order of this court, fully and faithfully to perform, 
carry out, and dIscharge each and all of the obligations, terms, 
conditions, and covenants on his part required to be per-
formed under the terms of said Rehabilitation and Reinsur-
ance Agreement; and, either with or without further order 
of this court, to make, do, execute, and deliver any and all 
stlch further or other acts, deeds, and things by him deemed 
reasonably necessary or desirable to effectuate the intents and 
purposes of said Rehabilitation and Reinsurance Agreement. 
and to assure and to confirm to Pacific Mutual Life Insurance 
Company, or its successors, an and singular the properties 
hereinbefore directed to be COll veyed and released to said 
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corporation, and to enable said corporation from and after 
the date hereof to conduct and continue to condnct a life 
and disability insurance business, as contemplated by said 
agreement. " 
Paragraph 16 provides: 
"That this court, without relinquishing by these specific 
provisions any jurisc1ietion by it retained as a matter of law, 
do, and it does hereby, specifically retain and reserye juris-
diction of the within proeeedings (for the purpose of author-
izing or approving any act of the Insurance Commissioner of 
the State of California done, or to bc <lone pursuant to or in 
accordance with this order, and) for the purpose of making 
or entering, upon application of the Insurance Commissioner 
of the State of California or of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance 
Company, any order, decree, judgment, or ruling required, 
permitted, or requested to be done, made, or entered in con· 
nection with or pursuant to the terms of said agreement, or 
for the effectuation of the purposes thereof." 
Since the contemplated plan of mutualization was not to 
be formulated for at least 10 years, the court could obviously 
not approve that plan at the time it entered its order ap-
proving the rehabilitation agreement. Moreover, it did not 
expressly approve in advance the carrying out of any mu-
tualization plan that might be presented by the price deter-
mination committee. Although standing alone the language 
permitting the commissioner to carry out the rehabilitation 
agreement "without further order of this court" might be 
interpreted as exhausting the court '8 jurisdiction over mu-
tualization, it may not reasonably be so interpreted in the 
light of the express reservation of jurisdiction "for the pur-
pose of making . . . any order . . . required . . . in con-
nection with or pursuant to the terms of said agreement." 
It is significant that in Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 
10 Ca1.2d 307, 322 [74 P.2d 761], this court was careful to 
note: "The plan also provides that the commissioner, either 
as conservator or liquidator, shall continue to hold all the 
stock of the new company as a protection to all old company 
policyholders. Ultimate mutualization, in the event the pol-
icyholders so elect is also provided for. The trial court re-
serves jurisdiction over the entire proceeding." Parag~aphs 
] 5 and 16 may be reconciled by interpreting them as author-
izing the commissioner without further order of the court to 
carry out the rehabilitation ar,reement to the extent that its 
provisions represented a completed plan for rehabilitation and 
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reinsurance, and at the same time reserving to the court juris-
diction to approve or disapprove plans to be developed in 
the future for mutualization or other disposal of the stock 
in the hands of the commissioner. Such an interpretation 
Qf the order subserves the primary purpose of section 1037. 
subdivision (d), and the statutes governing involuntary mu-
tualization by securing to all interested parties their right to 
court scrutiny of all steps in the proceedings that substantially 
affect their rights, and since the order is reasonably susceptible 
of that interpretation it should be adopted. Although the 
validity of the rehabilitation agreement and the order approv-
ing it are res judicata, the interpretation of the order is not 
res judicata, and it ~hould not be interpreted to sanction 
further departures from the statutory provisions than res 
judicata compels. (See lVatson v. Lawson, 166 Cal. 235. 242 
[135 P. 961]; Treece v. Treece, 125 Cal.App. 726, 728 [14 
P.2d 95].) 
The judgment should be reversed. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J .-1 dissent. 
rfhe majority opinion is a masterpiece of legal legerdemain. 
It approves a trallsaction whereby the policyholders of old 
company are deprived of between $18,000,000 and $24,000,000 
to which they are entitled under any concept of law and 
justice. It also deprives the stockholders of old company of 
whatever value their stock in old company may be worth in 
view of the fact that the assets of old company which were 
transferred to new company at the time of its creation were 
valued in excess of over $200,000,000. The majority concedes 
that new company was created in an insolvency proceeding 
and has always been used in said proceeding as an agency 
of the illsurance commissioner for the purpose of rehabilitating 
an insolvent insurance company, and that such proceeding is 
still pending because rehabilitation has not been completed. 
It nevertheless holds that "the new company is solvent and 
nondeliqucnt," even though it owes and is obligated to pay 
the policyholders of old company between $18,000,000 and 
$24,000.000 whieh it admittedly is not financially able to pay. 
In approvillg this transaction the majority disregards express 
statutory provisions of this state and deprives the stockholders 
and policyholders of old company of their right to a judicial 
review of the administrative proceeding whereby they were 
deprived of their property, thus denyini them due process 
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of law to which they are entitled under both state and federal 
constitutional provisions. 
THE UNDENIABLE FACTS 
On July 22, 1936, some 3,000 stockholders and 300,000 
policyholders of The Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company 
of California, hereinafter known as old company, were stunned 
by the news that the insurance commissioner had taken charge 
of the company, alleging it to be insolvent. This development 
was all the more shocking because of its suddenness and also 
because only a short time before, the regular, verified, annual 
statement of the company showed it to be in sound financial 
condition, as had similar previous statements from year to 
year consistently shown throughout its lifetime of over 68 
years. The business and assets of old company were then 
taken over by the insurance commissioner of this state pur-
suant to the provisions of sections 1011 and 1013 of the Insur-
ance Code. Thereafter, The Pacific Mutual Life Insurance 
Company was organized as part of a plan of rehabilitation 
of old company by the commissioner who purchased its entire 
capital stock with assets of old company. Pursuant to section 
1043 of the Insurance Code, a "Rehabilitation and Reinsur-
ance" agreement was entered into between the new company 
and the then insurance commissioner, as conservator of old 
company. The rehabilitation plan provided for the organiza-
tion of a new corporation with a capital of $1,000,000 which 
consisted of 10,000 shares at a par value of $100 each. The 
commissioner was to purchase all the outstanding stock of 
the new company with $3,000,000 in cash belonging to the old 
company (which gave new company an initial surplus of 
$2,000,000). The commissioner was then to transfer all the 
other assets of old company (with the exception of the stock 
of new company which, of course, was owned by old company) 
to new company, and new company was to assume all policies 
and obligations of the old company to the extent provided for 
in the plan. The plan provided that new company would 
assume all the obligations of the old company under existing 
policies with the exception of the non-can policies, which 
obligations were assumed on a reduced benefit schedule at 
the old premium rates. It was agreed that further benefits 
would be restored out of certain designated income of new 
company. All of new company's stock was purchased with 
$3,000,000 out of old company's funds. In addition, all the 
other assets of old ~mpany (over $200,000,000 assets in addi-
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tion to going agency organization and concern, good will, 
etc., "worth several millions of dollars" (Carpenter v. Pacific 
Mut. L. Ins. Co., 10 Ca1.2d 307, 325 [74 P.2d 761]) were 
transferred to new company. Therefore, new company owes 
.its creation and existence to old company. The confiscatory 
nature of this entire proceeding, including the present ma-
jority holding, is at once apparent when we see that old 
company's stockholders will ultimately only receive $3,000,000 
for their stock which, when old company was taken over, was 
supported by that amount in cash plus over $200,000,000 in 
various assets plus the value of good will, going business 
organization, etc., worth several millions of dollars! The 
agreement thus provided for a transfer to new company of 
the assets of old company (with certain exceptions not relevant 
here) and the assumption by new company of the obligations 
of old company, excluding certain noncancellable policies. 
With regard to these policies, known as the" non-can" policies, 
new company assumed a limited obligation and agreed to set 
up a special fund for the restoration of benefits thereunder. 
This obligation is still unpaid and outstanding. The capital 
stock of new company was to be held by the commissioner, 
as conservator, or liquidator, for the benefit of the creditors, 
policyholders, and stockholders of old company. On Decem-
ber 4, 1936, the agreement was approved by the trial court. 
In Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 10 Ca1.2d 307, 332, 
334 [74 P.2d 761 (affirmed Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 
297 [59 8.Ct. 170, 83 L.Ed. 182]), it was held that the 
organization of new company, as part of a plan to rehabilitate 
the business of old company was proper. It is pointed out 
(p. 322) that "Ultimate mutualization, in the event the policy-
holders so elect is also provided for." 
On February 2, 1937, an order was made providing for 
the liquidation of the old company and appointing the insur-
ance commissioner as liquidator. This order was upheld on 
appeal (Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 13 Cal.2d 306 
[89 P.2d 637]), although old company has never been dis-
solved. On April 4, 1938, the commissioner, as liquidator, 
transferred title to the capital stock of new company to 
voting trustees. This transfer was upheld on appeal (Cami-
netti v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 22 Ca1.2d 344 [139 P.2d 
908]). (Other aspects of this case have been decided by 
this court in Caminetti v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 22 Ca1.2d 
77 [136 P.2d 779] ; Carninetti v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 22 
Cal.2d 386 [139 P.2d 930]; Cam'inetti v. Pacific M'Ut. L.lm. 
) 
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00., 23 Ca1.2d 94 [142 P.2d 741] j Neblett v. Pacific Mut. L. 
Ins. Co., 22 Ca1.2d 393 [139 P.2d 934] ; Carpenter v. Pacific 
Mut. L. Ins. Co., 14 Ca1.2d 704. [96 P.2d 796] ; and by the 
appellate courts in Sanborn v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 42 
Cal.App.2d 99 [108 P.2d 458] j Gan-ison v. Pacific Mut. L. 
Ins. Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 1 [187 P.2d 893].) 
New company now seeks to acquire its stock (see later dis-
cussion) through the device of mutualization under section 
20 (a) of the rehabilitation agreement. The mutualization 
plan provides that the price to be paid for new company's 
stock is $3,000,000, with simple interest. If non-can benefits 
are fully restored prior to January 1, 1973, the purchase price 
is to be increased by an additional sum of $250,000 for each 
full year by which the date of completion of restoration pre-
cedes December, 1973. The purchase price is not absolutely 
payable, but is to be paid only "when and if" all the follow-
ing conditions are met: (1) Non-can restoration is completed; 
(2) the funds in a special surplus fund (to be created pur-
suant to the plan) plus the capital and surplus of new com-
pany, equal or exceed the purchase price of the stock; (3) 
the financial cond#ion of the new company is such that, after 
paying for and cancelling the stock, it would still have ad-
mitted assets in excess of all its liabilities amounting to the 
sum of 4 per cent of all admitted assets plus 25 per cent of 
the premiums collected during the preceding calendar year 
on all group insurance written on a one-year term basis and 
on all accident and health insurance. 
This resume shows that the new company was brought into 
existence as a creature of the state to rehabilitate old company 
and to carryon its business for that purpose. It also shows 
the grievous injustice being perpetuated by the majority in 
approving the plan of mutualization used here-that of vol-
untary mutualization of an insolvent corporation. This type 
of voluntary mutualization is as voluntary as a confession 
given under force, duress, and threats of bodily injury. Non-
can benefits have not been fully restored; even under the 
mutualization plan it is contemplated they will not be fully 
restored (if partial benefit payments can be considered "full" 
restoration) until 1973. Until such time as they are restored, 
new company cannot be considered as a solvent concern since 
it still owes a debt to the policyholders and stockholders of 
old company, which it admittedly cannot now pay. The 
amount of this debt is conceded to be between $18,000,000 
and $24,000,000. How can it then be said, with any degree 
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of honesty whatsoever, that new company is solvent and may 
avail itself of the statutory provisions relating to mutualiza. 
tion f I defy anyone to give an affirmative answer to this 
question. 
PRESENT PROCEEDING 
Purporting to act under paragraph 20 (a) of the rehabili-
tation and reinsurance agreement, a t>lan of mutualization 
was formulated by the committee and, on September 22, 1950, 
the insurance commissioner found that the plan protected the 
rights and interests of new company, its policyholders and 
shareholders, and that he was satisfied that the plan would 
be fair and equitable in its operation. 
Paragraph 20(a) of the rehabilitation and reinsurance 
agreement provides: 
"Mutualization and Disposition of Stock of New Company 
"(2) Neither the Conservator, nor, if one be appointed, 
the Liquidator, of the Old Company, shall dispose of any of 
the stock of the New Company except as follows: 
"(a) At any time between July 1, 1946 and January 1, 
1948, and thereafter so long as the Conservator or a Liquidator 
of the Old Company may continue to hold any or all of said 
stock, ten percent (10%) of the holders of participating 
policies of life insurance entitled to vote at a policy holders' 
election on a proposal for voluntary mutualization of the New 
Company, whether those re-insured hereunder or those issued 
by the New Company (each policy holder for this purpose 
being regarded as one person regardless of the number of 
policies owned or amount of insurance held) may request 
the New Company to create an Appointing Committee as 
hereinafter provided to exercise the duties and functions here-
inafter specified in respect of a proposed voluntary mutuali-
zation of the New Company, in accordance with the laws of 
the State of California in effect at the time of said request, 
or, if said laws then so permit, of anyone or more depart-
ments thereof. Such request shall specify the department or 
departments of the New Company desired to be mutualized. 
"Upon the receipt of such request the New Company shall 
c.eate an Appointing Committee consisting of the then Pres-
ident of the Association of Life Insurance Presidents, the 
President of Leland Stanford Jr. University, and the Provost 
of the University of California at Los Angeles, or persons 
occupying similar positions if their or any of their titles 
shall have been changed. In the event anyone or more of 
such persons shall refuse or be unable to act, the rema,injns 
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member or members shall fill the vacancy or vacancies thereby 
created by their appointment in writing of another person 
or persons of similar position and standing. If all of said 
persons refuse or are unable to act, the Court or any Judge 
thereof shall, on the application of the Commissioner. des-
ignate an A.ppointing Committee consisting of three (3) 
persons of similar position and standing. Said Appointing 
Committee, acting through not less than a majority of its 
members, shall designate a Price Determination Committee 
of not less than three and not more than five (5) persons 
skilled in matters of insurance company valuation, which 
committee, acting through not less than a majority thereof, 
shall determine whether in their opinion the proposed volun-
tary mutualization of the New Company, or of the department 
or departments tnereof specified in said request can then be 
practicably accomplished having due 1'egard to the interests 
of aU persons interested in the New Company.· If it can 
be determined that such mutualization is not then practicable 
no further steps shall be taken in connection with a possible 
mutualization of the New Company under the provisions of 
this subparagraph until at least six months after the date of 
such determination. If in the opinion of a majority of the 
members of the committee such mutualization is then prac-
ticable, the committee shall determine the proper price to be 
paid upon such mutualization and appropriate terms of pay-
ments thereof; said determination shall not be made, however, 
prior to January 1, 1947. 
"If, at the date of the appointment of such committee 
the New Company shall have in force Participating Life 
Insurance written subsequent to the effective date of this 
agreement in an amount in excess of its Non-Participating 
Life Insurance written during the same period, one-half (112) 
of such excess shall, for the purpose of fixing the proper 
price to be paid (but for no other purpose) be deemed to be, 
and shall be valued as, Non-Participating Life Insurance. 
If at the time of such appointment, there shall have been 
transferred from the Participating Department in accordance 
with the provisions of sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 6 
hereof, less than ten percent (10%) of the then accrued 
earnings described therein, or if there shall have been tl'ans-
ferred to the Participating Department any working capital 
pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph (c) of said para-
-The statutory scheme relating to insolvent companies is concerned 
with the protection of those interested in the insolven' eompan7. 
740 PACIFIC MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. MCCONNELL [44 C.2d 
graph 6, any unpaid balance thereof shall, for the purpose 
of fixing the proper price to be paid (but for no other pur-
pose) be deemed to be a debt then due and matured. Said 
Committee shall in its report to the New Company include a 
wan of mutualization of the New Company, or of the depart-
ment or departments thereof spccified in said request of the 
policy holders_ Such plan shall specify, in addition to any 
other relevant matters, the price to be paid, the terms of 
payment, and the persons by whom and the manner in which 
the right to vote the stock of the New Company is to be exer-
cised pending complete payment of the purchase price. In 
this connection the said Committee, if it deem it advisable, 
may provide in the plan for the creation of a voting trust, 
designate the initial trustees, and make provision for the 
appointment of their successors. Unless the benefits under 
Non-Can policies have theretofore been fully restored and 
claims against the Liquidator fully paid, such plan shall 
further provide that such mutualization shall not affect the 
provisions of paragraph 17 or of paragraph 14 hereof or 
the right of holders of Non-Can Policies to the restoration of 
benefits from the sources and in the manner therein provided. 
"The New Company agrees that within sixty (60) days 
after the making of such report (unless said report shall be 
to the effect that mutnalization is not then practicable) 
it will mail copies thereof to all of its policy holders entItled 
to vote upon such plan or plans of mutualization if submitted 
according to law. If within one hundred twenty (120) days 
after the mailing of such notice, ten per cent. (10%) of the 
policy holders cntitled to vote upon any such plan or plans 
(each policy holder being for this purpose regarded as oue 
person regardless of the number of policies owned or amount 
of insurance held) shall request in writing the submission 
thereof, the New Company will promptly submit the same 
in accordance with the laws of the R!ate of California then 
in effect. The Consc'rvator for himself and for any successors 
in the ownership of said stock claiming under him in any 
manner other than through a sale of said stock pursuant to 
the provisions of subparagraph (d) hereof agrees to consent 
and hereby consents as the holder and owner of the stock of 
tIll' New Company to such plan of mutualization. In the event 
said mutualization plan is adopted, the Conservator, or a 
liquidator as aforesaid, shall dispose of such stock in accord-
ancE' with such plan. 1'1Ie E'xpenses of the foregoing proceed-
ings including costs, fees and expenses of the Price Deter-
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mination Committee, shall be borne by the New Company, 
and unless the proposed plan of mutualization is consummated, 
shall be charged to the Participatdng Department thereof. 
"In the event the Price Determination Committee has been 
appointed as herein provided prior to January 1, 1948. said 
Committee shall have the power to extend the time within 
which mutualization may be effected hereunder for such perioci 
or periods of time as it may deem necessary for the orciE'rly 
completion of mutualization proceedings as herein ordered." 
(Emphasis added.) 
MUTUALIZATION 
The Insurance Code provides for mutualization of insur-
ance companies in two different ways. Division 1, part 2, 
chapter 1, article 14, sections 1010-1062, entitled "Proceed-
ings in Cases of Insolvency and Delinquency" provides in 
section 1043 for "Mutualization, reinsurance and rehabilita-
tion." Division 2, part 2. chapter 13, article 1, sections 11525-
11533, entitled "Voluntary Mutualization of Incorporated 
Life and Life and Disability Insurers Having a Capital Stock 
and Issuing Nonassessable Policies on a Reserve Basis" pro-
vides in sections 11525 and 11526 the "Authorization to 
mutualize" and the "Method of mutualization." 
There is no dispute concerning the method actually used 
in this proceeding. The rehabilitation plan provided for 
"voluntary" mutualization and the matter proceeded under 
sections 11525 and 11526. There is complete disagreement as 
to which method should have been used. Appellants correctly 
contend that the procedure outlined for "involuntary" 
mutualization of an "insolvent" insurer is the only proper 
method. 
As stated in Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 10 Ca1.2d 
807, 328 [74 P.2d 761], " .•• the proceedings here under 
review were taken under sections 1010 to 1061 of the Insur-
ance Code, adopted in 1935." (The other cases heretofore 
cited have reiterated this statement.) The original seizure 
of old company was accomplished under section 1011, sub-
division (d). Section 1045 provides "Mutualization of life 
insurer issuing nonassessable policies on a reverse basis: For-
mation of plan. If at any time after the issuance of an order 
under section 1011 affecting a life insurer issuing nonaSSQSS-
able policies on a reserve basis and organized with a capital 
stock evidenced by shares thereof it shall appear to the com-
missioner that the p'urposes of seclion 1011 ca11 be best attained 
\ ) 
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by the mutualization of such life insurer, the commissioner 
may /orm,ulate a plan for the mutualization of such insurer." 
(Emphasis added.) 
All proceedings heretofore had in this litigation have been 
.. as provided for in article 14 relating to insolvent and de-
·linquent insurers. The rehabilitation agreement provides for 
mutualization under the statutory scheme set up for solvent 
insurers. The majority opinion states "The new company is 
solvent and nondelinquent, and there is no sound reason why 
it should be mutualized under the statutes relating to in-
solvent insurers. . . . Section 1043 [which relates to insol-
vents], which authorizes the commissioner to enter into re-
habilitation agreements, contains no express limitation on 
what may be included in them, and section 1037 [which also 
relates to insolvents] provides that the enumeration of the 
powers of the commissioner shall not be construed as a limita-
tion upon him or upon his right to do such other acts as he 
may deem necessary in connection with the handling of the 
affairs of an insolvent company." (Emphasis added.) Thus 
the majority opinion admits the procedure relating to insol-
vents was the one used and impliedly admits that it is the 
correct procedure. However, in using the code sections re-
lating to insolvents, the author then argues that these sec-
tions place no limitation upon the commissioner. Section 
1037 provides that the powers and authority of the commis-
sioner in proceedings "under this article" (which relates to 
insolvents) shall not be construed as a limitation on his right 
to act or to do that "which he may deem necessary or ex-
pedient for the accomplishment or in aid of the purpose of 
such proceedings." Then, citing section 1043 (relating again 
to insolvents), we are told that the new company was properly 
organized by the commissioner who "evidently concluded" 
that the protection of creditors and" other interested parties" 
could best be accomplished through the formation of a new 
company "divorced as far as possible from the control of 
those who were in charge of the old company when it ex-
perienced financial difficulties." Then we are told that the 
new company is a separate and distinct entity. We are told 
this without any discussion of the character of new com-
pany, and with only the unreasoned and unsupported dictum 
in Garrison v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 83 Cal.App.2d 1, 
9-10 [187 P.2d 893], as authority therefor. 
Section 11525 (the procedure followed here) provides for 
"Av.tlwrizati<m III mv,tv,aUz6. A .olvent domestic incorpo-
) 
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rated insurer having a paid-in -capital represented by out-
standing shares of capital stock and issuing, on a reserve 
basis, nonassessable policies of life insurance or of both life 
and disability insurance, may convert itself into an incorpo-
rated mutual life insurer, or life and disability insurer, 
issuing nonassessable policies on a reserve basis. To that 
end it may provide and carry out a plan for the acquisition 
of the outstanding shares of its capital stock for the benefit 
of its policyholders, or any class or classes of its policyholders, 
by complying with the requirements of this chapter." (Em-
phasis added.) 
The question is thus directly posed as to whether new com-
pany falls within the classification of a "solvent" domestic 
incorporated insurer which "may convert itself into an in-
corporated mutual life insurer" which "may provide and 
carry out a plan for the acquisition of the outstanding shares 
of its capital stock for the benefit of its policyholders. " 
CHARACTER OF NEW COMPA.NY 
New company was organized by the insurance commissioner 
"with a name similar to that of the old company as a cor-
porate agent to assist him in carrying on the business of the 
old company" (Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 10 
Ca1.2d 307, 324, 325 [74 P.2d 761]). It was also said there 
(p. 327) that "The proceeding was had under sections 
1010 to 1061 of the Insurance Code which specially deal with 
the rehabilitation and liquidation of insurance companies. 
Those sections set up a comprehensive statutory scheme to 
accomplish those results. The proceeding is not one in which 
another party is prosecuting another party at all. It is 
simply a proceeding in which the state is invoking its power 
over a corporate entity permitted by the state to engage in a 
business vitally affected with the public interest upon con-
dition of continuing compliance with the requirements pro-
vided by the state. It is not a controversy between private 
parties but a proceeding by the state in the interest of the 
public." See also Caminetti v. Pacific Mut. L. 1m. Co., 
22 Ca1.2d 77, 82 [136 P.2d 779], where it was held that 
"The new company was the corporate agency of the Insur-
ance Commissioner as conservator for the purpose of c0n-
tinuing and preserving the business of tke old compatWy." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The commissioner held, either as conservator or later as 
liquidator, the entire capital stock of new company until 
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1938 when it was transferred to voting trustees (Caminetti v. 
Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 22 Cal.2d 344, 356 [139 P.2d 908]). 
It was there said that "The affairs of the new company are 
placed in charge of a board of directors to whom the agree-
.ment expressly confides a large measure of discretion. Super-
visory powers, however, are reserved to the commissioner, 
independent of and in addition to his statutory powers over 
delinquent insurance companies. For example, no invest-
ment or reinvestment of the assets of the old company may 
be made without written approval of the commissioner. Pay-
ments to the restoration fund for non-can policies are subject 
to the approval of the commissioner who, in addition, may re-
quire further payments thereto. The determination by the 
board of directors of the apportionment of expenses and the 
exchange of assets among the several departments of the new 
company is subject to adjustment by the commissioner. Re-
serves against policies of the old company subject to assump-
tion or reinsurance under the agreement were to be established 
by the new company with the approval of and in accordance 
with the requirements of the commissioner. While as holder 
of the stock the commissioner possessed the voting rights in-
cident thereto, the agreement contains no express provision 
with respect to the exercise of the voting power. . . . 
"The trustees are given legal title to the stock of the new 
company with the power to exercise all the rights of owner-
ship. The commissioner, however, retains the entire beneficial 
interest for the benefit of creditors of the old company and 
others interested. The voting trust undertakes to transfer to 
the trustees only administrative duties relating to the stock, 
principally the right to vote the same • ••. " (Emphasis 
added.) 
New company does not possess the characteristics of a sol-
vent company as that term is generally understood. First, 
it was organized as the agent of the commissioner to rehabili-
tate the business of the old company. It may be, as was said 
in the Garrison case, that it is a distinct entity without de-
tracting in the least from the fact that it is still an agent for 
the purpose of rehabilitating the old company. An agent, or 
servant, is usually a distinct entity, but the duties and ac-
tivities of sueh agent or servant, are carried out to serve the 
purposes of the principal. In other words, the agent acts for 
the principal, not for himself, or itself. Does the insurance 
commissioner ordinarily, and customarily, hold all the stock 
of a solvent insurance company 1 Does the insurance commis-
) 
..... 
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sioner ordinarily, and customarily, have reserved to himself 
supervisory powers, "independent of and in addition to his 
statutory powers" where a solvent company is concerned' 
Does an insurance commissioner ordinarily, and customarily, 
give his written approval of the investment or reinvestment 
of funds of a solvent insurance company? Does the insurance 
commissioner ordinarily, and customarily, tell the board of 
directors of a solvent company when and how they must ap-
portion expenses and exchange assets among its several de-
partments Y In the case of new company, the commissioner 
does all of those things. (See Chief Justice Gibson's opinion 
in Oaminetti v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 22 Ca1.2d 344, 356 
(139 P.2d 908].) 
New company would have no existence had it not been for 
the technical insolvency of old company. No new money con-
stituted the assets of new company which was organized with 
the assets of old company. If new company were a solvent 
independent and distinct corporation, the insurance commis-
sioner would not be holding its stock for the policyholders of 
old company. The stockholders of new company would be hold-
ing their own stock supported by assets in the hands of the 
officers and directors of the company. Section 11525 provides 
that" A solvent domestic incorporated insurer [is one] having 
a paid-in capital represented by outstanding shares of capital 
stock and issuing, on a reserve basis, nonassessable policies of 
life insurance or of both life and disability insurance. • . ." 
Surely in the normal case, "outstanding shares of capital 
stock" refers to stock held by stockholders, not by the com-
missioner! 
Mr. Justice Traynor has pointed out how the use of the 
solvent mutualization procedure has deprived the members of 
old \.~ompany of their right to the protection of court scrutiny 
of the plan of mutualization. He shows how the procedure used 
here cannot apply to the facts of the case because in the or-
dinary case of a voluntary mutualization, the shareholders 
would have the power to protect their interests by withholding 
their consent to the plan of mutualization. The sections of 
the code which relate to mutualization of insolvent companies 
were clearly intended by the Legislature to protect the in-
terests of the interested parties by providing for court ap-
proval. 
In the present case by the use of the procedure provided 
for in the case of a solvent company, the commissioner ap-
proves a plan to be formulated in the future. When that plan 
... 
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is formulated, as holder of all the stock, he votes for the plan. 
Then, as commissioner, he approves the plan as fair and equi-
table. \Ve are told by the majority opinion that "it must be 
assumed that the Legislature realized that the commissioner 
might be required to pass upon the fairness of a plan in a case 
where he, acting as conservator, had previously consented to 
mutualization on behalf of the stockholders." Nothing of the 
kind must be assumed. It is obvious from even a casual read-
ing of the code provisions relating to insolvent companies 
(1043 et seq.) and those relating to solvent companies (11525 
et seq.) that the Legislature had not the faintest thought that 
the two would be so commingled as they are in this case, or 
that the commissioner would be placed in a position where he 
was forced to approve a plan to be formulated some 10 years in 
the future, then, when the plan was formulated forced to vote 
an approval of it as a sole stockholder, and still later, to give 
his approval of something he had theretofore twice before 
approved. 
Ever since the inception· of the receivership proceedings 
and the organization of new company all the parties and 
proceedings concerned in the rehabilitation matter have been 
subject to the continuing jurisdiction and supervision of the 
court. It has been pointed out in various phases of this litiga-
tion that new company was organized by the commissioner as 
his corporate agent to rehabilitate the business of old com-
pany. Without the original proceeding under section 1011 (d) 
of the Insurance Code, new company would not have come 
into being. 
It is necessary, next, to note the difference in methods pro-
vided for in the two divisions of the Insurance Code for 
mutualization of insolvent and solvent companies. 
Section 1046 provides that" Said mutualization plan [called 
involuntary mutualization for insolvent companies and fol-
lows the section (1045) which provides: "If at any time after 
the issuance of an order under section 1011" the II commis-
sioner" shall formulate a plan of mutualization] shall include 
provisions for: 
"(a) r Acquisition of capital stock.] The acquisition by 
such insurer of all outstanding shares of its capital stock at a 
price and upon terms and conditions to be fixed as hereinafter 
provided. 
• (With the excepUOD. of the present proceedinK M be hereinafter 
cWcused.) 
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"(b) [Retirement of capital stock.] The retirement of said 
shares of stock when acquired by such insurer. 
"(c) [Amendment of charter.] The amendment of the 
charter of such insurer so as to enable it to transact its busi-
ness as a mutual insurer issuing nonassessable policies on a 
reserve basis. 
"(d) [Payment of claims.] The manner in which and the 
time within which, after mutualization is effected, matured 
and maturing claims against such insurer shall be paid to the 
lawful holders thereof. 
"(e) [Submission of plan to policyholders.] The submis-
sion of said mutualization plan to the policyholders of such 
insurer under such procedure as shall be set forth in the plan 
or prescribed by said court, for their approval or rejection. 
"(f) [Notice to shareholders.] Notice to the shareholders 
. of such insurer, in such manner and at such time after the 
approval of said mutualization plan by said policyholders, 
as the court may direct." 
Section 1048 provides that after the formulation of the 
mutualization plan, the commissioner shall submit it to the 
court for its order directing the submission thereof to the 
policyholders named in subdivision (e), of section 1046. 
Section 11526 (relating to solvent insurers) provides that 
"Such plan shall include appropriate proceedings for amend-
ing the insurer's articles of incorporation to give effect to the 
acquisition, by said insurer, for the benefit of its policyholders 
or any class or classes thereof, of the outstanding shares of 
its capital stock and the conversion of the insurer from a 
stock corporation into a nonstock corporation for the benefit 
of its members. The members of such nonstock corporation 
shall be the policyholders from time to time of the class or 
classes for whose benefit the stock of the insurer was acquired, 
and no other persons. Such plan shall be: 
" (a) Adopted by a vote of a majority of the directors. 
[As distinguished from the formation thereof by the commis-
sioner as provided in section 1045.] 
"(b) Approved by the vote of the holders of at least a 
majority of the outstanding shares at a special meeting of 
shareholders called for that purpose, or by the written con-
sent of such shareholders. r As dh,tinguished from section 
1048 requiring the commissioner to obtain court approval 
and an order of the court directing the submission of the plan 
to the policylwldcrs.] 
"(c) Submitted to the commissioner and approved by him 
J 
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in writing. [Under the circumstances here prevailing with 
regard to the commissioner's position as conservator, liqui-
dator and general supervisor of new company, this amounts 
to an idle act.] 
• " (d) Approved by a majority vote of all the policyholder. 
of the class or classes for whose benefit the stock is to be ac-
quired voting at an election by the policyholders called for 
that purpose, subject to the provisions of section 11528 .••• 
" (e) Filed in the office of the Insurance Commissioner 
after having been approved as provided in subdivisions (b), 
( c) and (d) of this section." 
Under the provisions of the rehabilitation agreement, a 
price determination committee consisting of four members was 
set up. The price determination committee reported to new 
company, in April, 1950, that mutualization was practicable 
and valued the stock of new company at $3,000,000. The 
mutualization plan provided in part for the payment of the 
purchase price with simple interest at the rate of long term 
government bonds (2%%). Under the terms of the re-
habilitation agreement, "The Conservator for himself and 
for any successors in the ownership of said stock claiming 
under him in any manner other than through a sale of said 
stock pursuant to the provisions of sub-paragraph (d) hereof 
agrees to consent and hereby consents as the holder and owner 
of the stock of the New Company to such plan of mutualiza-
tion. In the event said mutualization plan is adopted, the 
Conservator, or a Liquidator as aforesaid, shall dispose of 
such stock in accordance with such plan." 
Under the voluntary mutualization procedure heretofore set 
forth (section 11526) the mutualization plan is submitted 
to the commissioner after adoption by a vote of a majority of 
the directors and after a vote by a majority of the out-
standing shares at a special meeting of shareholders called 
for that purpose. Section 11527- provides that "The Com-
missioner shall examine the plan submitted to him under the 
provisions of subdivision (c) of section 11526. He shall not 
approve s,ltch plan unless in his opinion the rights and in-
terests of the insurer, its policyholders and shareholders are 
protected nor unless he is satisfied that the plan will be fair 
and equitable in its ope1·at-ion." (Emphasis added.) Fair 
and equitable to which company' 
Under the provision of the rehabilitation agreement here-
tofore set forth, the then commisRioner agreed for himself, 
and his successors, to agree to any plan promulgated by the 
) 
) 
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price determination committee. It should be borne in mind 
that the stock of new company is now held by voting 
trustees who had no discretioni but were (as stated in the 
insurance commissioner's answering brief, p. 73) "not only 
aut horized, but bound to give their consent; and [that] they 
had no discretion to exercise." (Emphasis that of the com-
missioner.) There is evidence in the record which shows that 
the trustees voted for the plan of mutualization because they 
were told to so vote; that they did not examine into the 
merits of the plan. The next step provided for in section 
11526 (Ins. Code) is that the plan shall be submitted to the 
commissioner for his written approval. The insurance com-
missioner states (Answering brief, p. 83), "As we have al-
ready shown, the Liquidator [commissioner] has bound him-
self to consent to a Plan of Mutualization proposed in accord-
ance with the Rehabilitation Agreement." The code, how-
ever, (§ 11527) provides that the commissioner shall examine 
the plan submitted to him under the provisions of subdivision 
(c) of section 11526 and that "He shall not approve such 
plan unless in his opinion the rights and interests of the in-
8urer, its policyholders and shareholders are protected nor 
unless ke is satisfied that the plan will be fair and equitable 
in its operation." (Emphasis added.) The net result, under 
the circumstances prevailing in this case, is that the commis-
sioner, as beneficial owner of all the stock of the new company, 
instructs the voting trustees to vote for any plan proposed by 
the price determination committee and then, when such plan 
is submitted to him for his approval, places his rubber stamp 
of approval thereon because he (or his predecessor) has, 10 
years prior to the promulgation of the plan, agreed to approve 
it no matter what it is-agreed, not only for himself, but for 
any successor in office, to approve the plan as proposed. It is 
shown, therefore, without a shadow of a doubt, that the 
earlier agreement to approve any plan proposed by the price 
determination committee has the effect of nullifying section 
11527 of the Insurance Code, as well as the sections relating 
to mutualization of insolvent insurers. 
Had the procedure outlined in sections 1045, 1046 and 1048 
been followed, the result would be very different. Under 
section 1045 the commissioner would formulate the mutualiza-
tion plan for the purpose of carrying out the rehabilitation of 
the insurer whose business was seized under the provisions of 
section 1011. The commissioner's plan would then be sub-
mitted to the court for its order directin£ the Bubmission of 
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the mutualization plan to the shareholders and policyholders 
of the seized insurer for their vote of approval, or disapproval 
as the case might be (§ 1046, subds. (e) and (f». Old com-
pany, not having been dissolved, still exists; new company 
was organized as the corporate agent of the commissioner to 
rehabilitate the business of old company with the assets of 
old company. New company cannot, as it appears, be con· 
sidered as a completely independent and solvent organization 
under the facts here prevailing. As I have pointed out, the 
commissioner holds the entire beneficial interest in all the 
capital stock of new company for the benefit of stockholders, 
policyholders and creditors of old company; the legal title 
to the stock of new company is held by voting trustees who 
vote it as directed by the commissioner. As I have also 
pointed out, the board of directors of new company are under 
the close supervision, control and direction of the commis. 
sioner and must, in reality, take orders from him as to every 
major, and some minor, business details. It cannot be said 
that this close supervision, control and direction exist in the 
usual "solvent" corporation. 
CORPORATE ENTITY OF NEW COMPANY 
Respondents argue that the corporate entity of new com-
pany cannot be disregarded so as to make the proposed 
mutualization a mutualization of old company. In support 
of this contention, In re Bond & Mortg. Guar. Oorp., 157 Misc. 
240 [283 N.Y.S. 623, 652], and Garrison v. Pacific "b'l1tt. L. Ins. 
00., 83 Cal.App.2d 1, 9-10 [187 P.2d 893], are cited. In 
neither case was mutualization involved. In the Bond & 
Mortgage Guarantee case, the superintendent of insurance had 
organized Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Oorporation "as a 
domestic insurance corporation, with a capital of $1,000,000, 
a surplus of $2,000,000, and a reserve for contingencies of 
$200,000, all of which was paid out of the assets of the guar-
antee company in exchange for the entire capital stock of the 
new corporation, 10,000 shares of the par value of $100 each; 
a certificate for said number of shares was issued in the name 
of the guarantee company and is held by the superintendent 
of insurance as an asset, for the benefit of the creditors (in-
cluding the policyholders), of the guarantee company." (Em-
phasis added.) The guarantee corporation here involved took 
on the duty of insuring mortgages, "but on a restricted basis 
under a limited policy of gnaranty." (Pp. 641, 650.) This 
case involved a proc('('niiH! whereby the Peoplf', and certain 
individuals interested, applied for an order enjoining tho 
) 
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State Mortgage Commission from demanding and receiving 
or assuming control of certain mortgages being serviced by 
the guarantee corporation pursuant to court order. 'fhe in-
junction was granted. The contention was that the guarantee 
corporation, in servicing mortgages, was acting without ade-
quate corporate powers. The court held that the corporation 
was acting within its corporate authority and, in answer to the 
contention that the guarantee corporation was a state agency 
inseparable from the superintendent of insurance (so as to 
permit another state agency, the Mortgage Commission, which 
came into being after the proceedings set forth had been 
had) to take it over, the court said: "Said corporation is 
like any other corporation; a distinct entity. All of its stock 
is owned by guarantee company, and the certificate therefor 
is held in the custody of the superintendent; this he holds as 
he does any other assets of the company in rehabilitation, as a 
receiver designated by statute for the benefit of the creditors 
and stocl{holders of said company; not as an owner, represent-
ing the state. It is a stock corporation, having been created, 
for one thing, with a view to its poss'tole sale for the benefit 
of the creditors, as its exhaustive by-laws make apparent. 
During such time as the stock control remains as it is, the 
operation of the corporation is to be under the supervision of 
the superintendent as rehabilitator." (Emphasis added.) 
The court continued and said that the primary management 
of the corporation was with the board of directors, although it 
was subject to the supervision of the superintendent "in 
his capacity as supervisor of insurance companies" (pp. 651, 
652). The situation presented in the New York case and 
that presented in the case at bar are factually similar up to 
a point. I have heretofore quoted extensively from Oaminetti 
v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 22 Ca1.2d 344, at page 356 [139 
P.2d 908], wherein we set forth the extensive and minute 
supervision exercised by the commissioner over new com-
pany. This supervision exceeded by far anything required 
of him as "supervisor of insurance companies." We also 
said in Oarpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 10 Ca1.2d 307, 
324, 325 [74 P.2d 761], that new company was organized 
"as a corporate agent to assist him [commissioner] in carry-
ing on the business of tlIe old company." (See also Oaminetti 
v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 22 Ca1.2d 77, 80 [136 P.2d 719].) 
In Garrison v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 83 Cal.App.2d 1 
[187 P.2d 893], the court said, "The question for decision 
iii whether an insurance company which was organized to 
\ ) 
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conserve an insolvent insurance company and to rehabilitate 
its business is obligated to pay interest on claims allowed by 
the conservator against such insolvent, based upon the breach 
by the latter of certain policies, in the absence from the 
~ehabilitation agreement of a specific promise to pay such 
interest, the agreement having provided for the payment to 
the liquidator for the benefit of such claimants an amount 
equal to the sum of all 'allowed claims' against the insolvent 
company." New company, by the terms of the rehabilitation 
agreement had agreed (Paragraph 17) "to pay to the liq-
uidator for payment to claimants an amount equal to the 
sum of all claims against old company filed with the liquidator 
and finally allowed." The court answered the question put 
with this statement: "It is customary practice in liquidation 
proceedings to marshal the assets of the debtor, fix the amount 
of its liabilities and disburse the assets among the creditors 
pro rata. Such a process would not be possible, if during the 
season of liquidation, the claims should be varied by the addi-
tions of varying amounts of interest." (P. 9.) Respondents 
rely upon the following paragraph from the opinion of the 
District Court in the Garrison case: "Appellants contend 
that new company is a reincarnation of old company and, 
therefore, has impliedly promised to pay all of the latter's 
indebtedness. In this they ignore provisions of the Insur-
ance Code, article 14 of chapter 1, part 2, division 1, which 
article deals with insolvency and liquidation proceedings. 
Section 1043 of such article provides that in any proceeding 
under the article, tke commissioner may mutualize or reinsure 
tke business of any person affected by proceedings thereunder 
and may enter into rehabilitation agreements. New company 
was organized by tke sovereign power for tke purpose of re-
habilitating tke b'usiness of one of its own c,.eatures wkose very 
existence inkered in tke blood and sweat of tk~ people. It 
was to go forward under the guidance of the state. Its identity 
is utterly distinct from that of old company, notwithstanding 
the latter's equitable ownership of new company's stock. It 
cannot be fairly said that it is a continuance of old company. 
It did not take over the latter's assets or assume its burdens 
at the behest of old company. Such transfer and assumption 
were rendered indispensable to the public weal and were 
required by law to conserve the common good in general and 
the army of policyholders of old company in particular. New 
company was not organized by old company to do service in 
a prescribed manner for the latter but was created bl the state 
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to perform a public service. It must be and act in its own 
right upon the arena of trade and commerce and of human 
existence, free from the fetters 0:£ a collapsed institution which 
in the kaleidoscope of a changing world will soon be only 
a memory." (Pp. 9, 10.) New company was organized by 
the state to rehabilitate the business of old company; as the 
"corporate agent" of the insurance commissioner for that 
purpose. The language just quoted is, in part, illogical under 
the facts presented in this long line of litigation, including 
the Garrison case. It appears to me that the statement that 
"its [new company] identity is 'Utterly distinct" is incon-
sistent with the latter part of the same sentence that this was 
so "notwithstanding the latter's [old company] equitable 
ownership of new company's stock" and with one of the 
preceding sentences wherein it is said that "New companJ 
was organized by the sovereign power for the purpose of 
rehabilitating the business of" old company, and the fact 
that new company" was to go forward under the guidance of 
the state." The duties and obligations imposed upon the 
commissioner in this case amount to far more than his usual 
supervision of the usual solvent insurance company. There 
can be no doubt that new company is a separate corporate 
agency and that it was not organized by old company, but it 
does not logically follow that it is "utterly distinct" from 
old company. In my opinion, new company would have no 
e:T~::;tence but for the insolvency proceedings against old com-
pany. It also conclusively appears that the quoted statement 
from the Garrison case is dictum since it had nothing to do 
with the question involved there. 
Respondents also argue that because this court said in 
Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 10 Cal.2d 307, 334 
[74 P.2d 761], that new company was, as a reinsurer, "sub-
stituted as an insurer in the place and stead of the original 
insurer" that the corporate identity of new company cannot 
be disregarded; that because this court said in the Carpenter 
case (p. 335) that "Every policyholder who consents to the 
Plan clearly enters into a novation with the New Company" 
that the two companies cannot be considered as "essentially 
one and the same." New company will in time replace old 
company but so long as old company exists in any form, it is 
clear that new company is still only the c01'porate age1it of 
the commissioner for the purpose of rehabilitating the busi-
ness of old company and that the mutualization plan must 
be worked out in accordance with the procedure provided for 
) 
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in that part of the Insurance Code relating to involuntary 
mutualization of insolvent companies. The stock of new com-
pany, held now by voting trustees, with beneficial ownership 
in the commissioner is still held by him for the benefit of 
~he policyholders and creditors of old company. This fact 
cannot be disregarded; nor can the rights of the policyholders 
and creditors of old company be disregarded. In holding 
that new company is "utterly distinct" from old company 
for all purposes, a majority of this court chooses to forget 
all the facts concerning this litigation and pretends that new 
company was organized as any other insurance company with 
its own assets and liabilities, that the insurance commissioner 
had only the normal, nominal, supervision over its affairs. and 
that no insolvency proceedings had ever been involved. In 
the light of the record before us, such a holding cannot 
stand the test of honest scrutiny. 
RES JUDICATA 
Respondents argue that it has been decided by the superior 
court that the commissioner had authority to include in a 
rehabilitation agreement an option to mutualize the new com-
pany by voluntary proceedings and to agree to dispose of the 
stock of new company at the price, and on the terms, fixed 
by the price determination committee; and that this court 
has decided that the superior court had jurisdiction to so 
decide and that the superior court did not abuse its discretion 
in approving the rehabilitation agreement. 
In the commissioner's answering brief (p. 61) is found 
this statement: "It is true that no attack seems to have been 
made on the mutualization provisions [of the rehabilitation 
agreement1 in any of the appellate proceedings, but the courts 
have taken notice of them in determining various appeals." 
Neither this court, nor an appellate court, has been concerned 
in any of this litigation with the mutualization provisions of 
the rehabilitation agreement as will hereinafter appear. 
In Oarpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 10 Ca1.2d 307, 
322 [74 P.2d 7611, we said that the plan of rehabilitation 
provided for "Ultimate mutualization, in the event the policy-
holders so elect. " We were there concerned in the main with 
the organization of new company as the corporate agent of 
the commissioner to rehabilitate the business of old company. 
In Oarpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 13 Ca1.2d 306 [89 
P.2d 637], we were concerned with the validity of the" Order 
for Liquidation" and the mutualization provisions of the plan 
wen not considered. In Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. 1M. Co., 
) 
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14 Ca1.2d 704 [96 P.2d 796], we were concerned with an 
order of the trial court correcting its minutes, nunc pro tunc. 
In Caminetti v. Pacific Mut. E~ Ins. Co., 22 Ca1.2d 77 [136 
P.2d 779], we were concerned with the claims of dissenting 
policyholders and, once again, the mutualization provisions 
were not considered. In Camineiti v. Pacific lIlut. L. Ins. Co., 
22 Cal.2d 344, 353 [139 P.2d 908], we were concerned with 
the propriety of creating a voting trust with the stock of 
new company under the provisions of section 1037, subdivision 
(e), of the Insurance Code. We said there that "To adopt 
the contention that section 1037 (e) was not intended to I 
apply to stock of an insurance company organized as a medi1lm 
througJt which rehabilitation of the business of a delinquent 
insurer was to be accomplished would require us to disregard 
the clear language of the statute. Section 1037 (e) specifically 
refers to stock issued to the commissioner 'as conservator or 
as liquidator in connection with a rehabilitation or reinsur-
ance agreement.'" (Emphasis added.) We also said there 
(p. 355) that the rehabilitation agreement (Paragraph 20) 
related to the" ultimate status and ownership of the new com-
pany." We then pointed out that subdivision (a) (Paragraph 
20) authorizes the commissioner to dispose of the stocl~ in ac-
cordance with "any plan of mutualization thereafter adopted 
by the policyholders of the new company, and such a dispo-
sition may include a transfer to voting trustees if the plan of 
mutualization so provides. " We held that the voting trust 
agreement was not a disposal of the stock within the meaning 
or purpose of Paragraph 20 of the rehabilitation agreement 
and we said (p. 358) that "It is true that the words 'dispose 
of' are used in subdivision (a) of paragraph 20 in connec-
tion with an authorization to the commissioner to transfer 
the stock of the new company to voting trustees in accord-
ance with a plan of mutualization. But it is clear that uncle,. 
that subdivision the transfer there provided for would require 
a complete alienation of the stock in order to carry out the plan 
of mutualization contemplated therein." (Emphasis added.) 
Again, the validity of the mutualization procedure was not 
passed upon; the only holding being that the rehabilitation 
agreement did not preclude the creation of the voting trust. 
In Caminetti v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 22 Ca1.2d 386. [139. 
P.2d 930], we were concerned with disqualification of a judge 
and a party's waiver thereof. Mutualization was not con-
sidered. In Caminetti v. Pacific 1I1ut. L. Ins. Co., 23 Ca1.2d 94 
[142 P.2d 741], we were concerned with the correctness of the 
... 
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measure of damages adopted by the commissioner to be a1· 
lowed disability policyholders. In Garn'son v. Pacific Mut. L. 
Ins. Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 1 [187 P.2d 893], the court was con· 
cerned with the q llcstion of iutcrest on claims allowed by the 
eommissioner. In Sanborn v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 42 Cal. 
App.2d 99 [108 P.2d 458], the court pointed out that the fol· 
lowing questions were involved: What was the effective date 
of the agreement between new company and the insurance 
commissioner as conservator of old company? Did appellant '8 
pI'esent disability commence prior to such date and was notice 
of claim filed in accordance with the agreement' 
It is contended by respondents, however, that a judgment 
upholding the validity of a contract establishes its validity, 
not only against the attacks actually made, but against those 
that could have been made, even though no question of in· 
valillity was raised in the original proceeding and even though 
the judgment does not expressly pass on the contract. 
Appellants argue that the procedure for mutualization pro· 
vided for by statute cannot be altered by contract and that 
any attempt to do so is against public poiicy, illegal and void. 
It is true, of course, that the plan of mutualization, as pro· 
posed by the price determination committee, has never been 
before the courts until the present proceeding. 'fhe trial 
court, in its order of December 4, 1!)36, stated (13) "That 
said Rehabilitation and Reinsurance Agreement, and each and 
all of the terms and conditions thereof, and the plan therein 
embodied are, and each of them is, hereby approved; •.. " 
(Clk. Tr., p. 169.) This was an approval only of the agree· 
ment and, while grossly wrong, does not now preclude this 
court from correcting the error since the plan of mutualization 
was not passed upon nor could it have been since it was to be 
promulgated 10 years in the future. 
We said in the Caminetti case (22 Ca1.2d 344, 363) "This 
proceeding is wholly statutory. The duties imposed upon the 
commissioner, and the supervision over him vested in the 
courts, result from the statute." Appellants, citing Forten-
bury v. Superior Court, 16 Ca1.2d 405, 407-408 [106 P.2d 411], 
contend that if the order of the trial court (December 4, 1!)36) 
is considered as having approved a plan of mutualization con-
trary to the statutory provisions therefor, it is void for want 
of jurisdiction of the subjed matter. The respondents' po· 
sition is that this court having previously determined the 
trial court's j urisdictiol1. the mu Ltcr is res judicata. In the 
Fortenbury casel' we said "1'he term jurisdiction originally 
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included only the right to hear and determine concerning the 
subject matter in a particular case. But the modern tendency 
has been to broaden the meaning, particularly where the right 
to review a decision by certiorari, or other prerogative writ 
is the question for decision. A court may have jurisdiction of 
the cause of action and of the parties, but it may lack the 
authority or power to act in the case except in a particular 
way. Under such circumstances, it is now generally held that 
the court had no jurisdiction. As pointed out in the case of 
Spreckels S. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 186 Cal. 256, 260 
[199 P. 8], 'the word is frequently used as meaning authority 
to do the particular thing done, or, putting it conversely, a 
want of jurisdiction frequently means a want of authority 
to exercise in a particular manner a power which the board 
or tribunal has, the doing in excess of the authority pos-
sessed.' " (Emphasis added.) We also said in First Industrial 
Loan Co. v. Daugherty, 26 Ca1.2d 545, 556 l159 P.2d. 921], 
that "It is elementary that power given to the Commissioner 
of Corporations (by section 10 of the act) 'to establish such 
rules and regulations as may be reasonable or necessary to 
carry out the purposes and provisions of this act' does not 
include power to alter the statute or enlarge or impair its 
scope." (Emphasis added.) 
It seems apparent that if the involuntary mutualization 
provisions for insolvent insurance companies are applicable 
the commissioner was acting without statutory authority in 
approving a plan of mutualization based upon the statutory 
provisions relating to voluntary mutualization of solvent com-
panies and that his approval thereof was void, as was his 
agreement to approve such a plan. The rule is settled that a 
contract in violation of an express statutory provision is void 
and that it· is not necessary that the statute expressly so de-
clare (City of Oakland v. California Const. Co., 15 Ca1.2d 573, 
576 [104 P.2d 30]). A contract made in any manner except 
that expressly provided in the applicable statute is ipso facto 
void (Dale v. Palmer, 106 Cal.App.2d 663, 667 [235 P.2d 
650]). If upon review of all the legislation on the subject 
the contract appears to contravene the design and policy of 
the laws, the courts will not enforce it (Kreamer v. Earl, 91 
Cal. 112 [27 P. 735] ; Loew's Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641): See 
lIill v. Bank of San Pedro, 41 Cal.App.2d 595, 607 [107 P.2d 
399] ; County of San Diego v. California Water etc. Co., 30 
Ca1.2d 817 [186 P.2d 124, 175 A.L.R. 747]; Film Producers, 
Inc. v. Jordo/ll, 171 Cal. 664 [154 P. 605]. 
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The parties are in disagreement as to whether or not the 
mutualization provisions were litigated at the time the order 
of Deccmber 4, 1936, was made. The insurance commissioner 
says that "Presumably these provisions did not go entirely 
,unchallenged in the proceedings leading up to the Order of 
Rehabilitation." (Emphasis added.) (Insurance commission-
er's answering brief, p. 61.) New company asserts that the 
"validity" of the rehabilitation agreement was put in issue 
and decided by the order of December 4, 1936, and that the 
same has been approved by this court. From all that appears, 
it is obvious that the precise question here involved has never 
been passed upon. It most certainly has not been passed upon 
by an appellate court, or by this court. Respondent, new com-
pany, points to the following quotations from the pleadings 
in the original proceeding as showing that the mutualization 
provisions of paragraph 20 (a) were litigated. "Answer of 
Certain Interveners to Petition for Approval of Second Pro-
posed Rehabilitation and Reinsurance Agreement, Folios 2757-
2759 of Transcript on Appeal. L.A. 16182: 
"That said plan, if executed, would be entirely void and of 
no effect, and would not be binding upon the parties thereto, 
and that the execution of the same is beyond the authority 
of the said Samuel L. Carpenter, Jr., as Insurance Commis-
sioner of the State of California and as Conservator of The 
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company of California [old 
company], and that the execution of said agreement and the 
transfer of the assets by the said Insurance Commissioner is 
wholly unauthorized by the Insurance Code of the state of 
California and is entirely beyond the power of the said Samuel 
L. Carpenter, Jr., as Insurance Commissioner and as Con-
servator as aforesaid, and the said agreement will be void 
when executed and beyond the power of the Insurance Com-
missioner under the statute in such cases made and provided 
and that the said agreement is of no binding effect whatever 
on any of the parties thereto and that any acts done pursuant 
thereto are wllOlly null and void." 
U Amended Complaint in Intervention of Certain Inter-
venors, Folio 3882 of Transcript on Appeal, L.A. 16182: 
"That the approval of said agreement is beyond the au-
thority and jurisdiction of this court and, if given, would 
be void and of no force and effect, for the reason that authority 
therefor is not given in, and, in fact, is forbidden by, the 
terms and provisions of said InSllrance Code of California, 
and, in particular, of artidcs is [sic] and 14 of chapter 1 of 
part 2 of division 1 thereof." 
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It appears to me that what was undoubtedly meant by 
these pleadings was that the organization of new company 
was said to be beyond the commissioner's power since that 
was the major issue in Carpenter v. PaC1:fic M1lt. L. Ins. Co., 
10 Ca1.2d 307 [74 P.2d 761]. 
The next question that arises is whether or not the pro-
visions for mutualization could have been litigated in that 
proceeding inasmuch as mutualization was not to take place 
until between 1946 and 1948, or "so long as the Conservator 
or a Liquidator of the Old Company may continue to hold any 
or all of said stock .... " (Paragraph 20 (a), rehabilitation 
agreement.) The proposed voluntary mutualization plan was 
also to be in accordance "with the laws of the State of Cali-
fornia in effect at the time of said request. . . ." The plan 
was also not to be proposed unless the price determination 
committeee "shall determine whether in their opinion the 
proposed voluntary mutualization of the New Company ... 
can then be practicably accomplished .... " In Silva v. 
City &- County of San Francisco, 87 Cal.App.2d 784 [198 
P.2d 78], a county board of supervisors passed a resolution 
that certain land of plaintiff's should be acquired when neces-
sary. Plaintiff sued for a declaration as to the value of his 
property. The court, in refusing to place plaintiff's valllation 
on the property, declared: "The court may take judicial 
knowledge that real estate values do not remain constant. 
The value fixed during the present period may be dispropor-
tionate to what should be paid when the recreation depart-
ment of the city decides to use the property as part of a 
'playground.' Plaintiff seeks a final determination that the 
property is worth $10,000 and that if and when defendant 
chooses to take the property this will be the amount it must 
pay." (Emphasis that of the court.) It was also said that 
" ... the present complaint alleges in substance that the 
value of the property may be determined thro1.lgh condemna-
tion proceedings when defendant deems it 'necessary.' The 
only declaratory judgment that could be rendered under the 
allegations of the complaint would be of an advisory nature-
namely, that when defendant deems it necessary to institute 
condemnation proceedings the price be fixed at the then 
market value." (Pp. 788-789.) • 
In Young v. Young, 100 Cal.App.2d 85, 87 [223 P.2d 25], 
it was held that an action to establish a foreign decree of 
divorce in California, and for ratification by the California 
court of a property settlement included in the foreign de-
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cree, did not present a justiciable controversy in the absence 
of a showing that defendant had refused or failed to comply 
with the foreign decree or the terms of the property settlement 
agreement. It was held that "The rule is accurately stated in 
• 1 California Jurisprudence (1921) at page 335, section 25, 
as follows: 'To invoke the jurisdiction of a court of justice, it 
is primarily essential that there be involved a genuine and 
existing controversy, calling for present adjudication as in-
volving present rights.' (See also Neill v. Five O. Refining 
00., 79 Cal.App.2d 191 [179 P.2d 818]), wherein Mr. Justice 
Drapeau thus pointedly states the rule at page 193, 'An action 
not founded upon an actual controversy, or prosecuted "for 
the gratification of the curiosity of the litigants" is collusive 
and will not be entertained. [Citing cases.] , " 
In Merkley v. Merkley, 12 Ca1.2d 543, 547 [86 P.2d 89], the 
court stated that" The facts in the record present an academic 
question only. The courts will not exercise the discretionary 
power to declare rights which do not give rise to a present 
controversy. ' , 
In Oounty of San Diego v. Oalifot'nia Water etc. 00., 30 Cal. 
2d 817,823,826 (186 P.2d 124, 175 A.L.R. 747], a case involv-
ing an agreement by a county to relocate a county highway, 
we enunciated the following rule: That if the Legislature had 
provided a method by which a county or city might abandon 
or vacate roads, that method was exclusive. We said: "It 
is clear, however, that neither the doctrine of estoppel nor 
any other equitable principle may be invoked against a govern-
mental body where it would operate to defeat the effective 
operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. (See 
Millet v. McKinnon, 20 Ca1.2d 83 [124 P.2d 34, 140 A.L.R. 
570], and cases cited therein; Pan American Petro &- Transp. 
Co. v. Un,ited States, 273 U.S. 456, 505-506 [47 S.Ct. 416, 71 
L.Ed. 734] ; American S1trety 00. of N. Y. v. United States 
(C.C.A. 10th), 112 F.2d 903, 906.) In the American Surety 
Company case the court stated that the government could not 
be estopped so as to 'frustrate the purpose of its laws or thwart 
its public policy.' (112 F.2d, at p. 906.) In 3 McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations l2d ed., 19431. section 1266, it is said 
that various statutory procedures or steps exist to protect citi-
zens and taxpayers from iU-considered contracts or those show-
ing favoritism and that if recovery is allowed for property or 
services on the ground of estoppel or implied contract, C then 
it follows as the night the day that the statute or charter 
provision can always be evaded and set at naught. The 
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author adds that the rule denying indirect enforcement of 
such void contracts harmonizes with our governmental system, 
appears to be supported by reason, and is not unjust, because 
the other party is charged with notice of the law." 
At any rate, the plan of mutualization, as distinguished 
from the provisions for mutualization as found in the re-
habilitation agreement, has never until this case, been passed 
upon. That plan, while following the outline contained in 
Paragraph 20(a) made some 10 years prior to'the promulga-
tion of the one here under consideration, is an entirely dif-
ferent matter and may properly be held void as not in 
accordance with the statutory scheme for involuntary mutual-
ization of insolvent insurance companies seized by the com-
missioner under the provisions of sections 1010 and 1011 of 
the Insurance Code. The rule enunciated in County of San 
Diego v. California Water etc. Co., supra, hereinabove set 
forth would be applicable if the plan of mutualization is held 
void as against public policy and as being in excess of the 
commissioner's jurisdiction. 
It should be noted that Paragraph 20(f) contains a pro-
vision to the effect that if all, or any part, of the paragraph 
should be contrary to law, or illegal, or void, the vulnerable 
provision should be deemed separable and the balance of the 
agreement should stand. If, as I believe, the validity of 
Paragraph 20(a) has never been before determined, the pro-
vision just noted w0uld prevent anything that has been here-
tofore determined by either this court, or any appellate court, 
from conflicting with the determination made here. 
TRIAL DE Novo 
If the procedure for involuntary mutualization had been 
followed, as it should have been, this question would never 
have arisen. Section 1048 of the Insurance Code provides 
that after the formulation of the mutualization plan. it 
"shall" be submitted by the commissioner to the court for 
its approval. The clear import of the procedure outlined 
for insolvent organizations is that those possessed of property 
rights in them must be accorded court protection at every 
stage. For example, the court appoints the appraisers 
(§ 1051). Such court approval, required by section 1048, ac-
cords the interested parties the equivalent of a trial de novo. 
According to the majority opinion, the" alternative" reason 
given for affirmance is reliaiH~e upon the doctrine of res 
judicata. That this reason is patently false is shown by Mr. 
) 
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Justice 'l'raynor when he points out that the court "could 
obviously not approve [the] plan at the time it entered its 
order approving the rehabilitation agreement. Moreover, it 
did not expressly approve in advance the carrying out of 
allY mutualization plan that might be presented by the price 
determination committee." He shows that there is reserved to 
the court, by the agreement, continuing jurisdiction to ap-
prove or disapprove plans to be developed in the future for 
mutualization or other disposal of the stock in the hands of 
the commissioner. He points out that to so interpret the order 
subserves the primary purpose of section 1037, subdivision 
( d), of the Insurance Code by securing to all interested 
parties "their right to court scrutiny." Appellants have not 
been accorded "court scrutiny" in its true sense. 
Appellants correctly contend that the order of the com-
missioner approving the plan of mutualization was subject to 
full judicial review by the superior court. It is argued that 
the commissioner, in making his order, acted in a judicial 
capacity rather than in an administrative or legislative capac-
ity as contended by respondents. Appellants contend that in 
reviewing a decision or order of a statewide administrative 
agency or of a state officer, the superior court must reweigh 
the evidence and determine for itself according to its inde-
pendent judgment whether or not the decision is supported 
by the weight or preponderance of the evidence in every case 
where state judicial functions are involved. They rely upon 
Thomas v. Oalifornia Emp. Stab. Oom., 39 CaI.2d 501, 504 
[247 P.2d 561] ; Moran v. Board of ~fedtical Examiners, 32 
Ca1.2d 301, 308 [196 P.2d 20] ; Laisne v. Oalifornia State Board 
of Optometry, 19 Ca1.2d 831, 834-835 [123 P.2d 457] ; and 
Drummey v. State Board of Funeral Directors &- Embalmers, 
13 Ca1.2d 75 [87 P.2d 848]. Respondents, on the other hand, 
argue that the commissioner's order was an exercise of execu-
tive power and was not the exercise of such full judicial 
power as to entitle appellants to have the trial court exercise 
its independent judgment with respect to the weight of the 
evidence. Respondents rely upon the cases of Bank of Italy 
v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1 [251 P. 7841; Doble Steam Motors 
Oorp. v. Daugherty, 195 Cal. 158 f232 P. 140] ; McDonough 
v. Goodcell, 13 Ca1.2d 741 r91 P.2d 1035, 123 A.L.R. 1205], 
and Southern Oalir Jockey Cl'ub, Inc. v. Oalifornia etc. Raoing 
Board, 36 Ca1.2cl 167 [223 P.2d 1]. 
The duties of the COlIHllissioner, as set fortIl in section 
12921 have been held to be "that of a minister of the court 
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in possession of the property, to the end of conserving the 
rights of everybody having any interest" (H. D. Roosen Co. v. 
Pacific Radio Pub. Co., 123 Cal.App. 525 [11 P.2rl 873]) 
and- discretionary (Garris v. Carpenter, 33 Cal.App.2d 64g, 
657 [92 P.2d 688]). It was held in Caminetti v. Guaranty 
Union Uife Ins. Co., 22 Ca1.2d 759, 764 [141 P.2d 423], that 
the commissioner '8 ". • . office is not to perform functions 
in aid of the court's jurisdiction to decide a controversy be-
tween litigants, but he acts as a statutory officer, subject how-
ever to judicial supervision to prevent an arbitrary exercise 
of power or neglect of duty." The court in the Caminetti 
case, however, was referring to the commissioner as a re-
ceiver of the assets of insurance companies and stated that 
he did not derive his power from the court, bllt from the 
statute. 
The distinction in the two lines of cases relied upon by 
appellants and respondents is that in those relied upon by 
appel1ants an existing vested property right was extinguished, 
or taken away, by the administrative order. For example, 
in the Drummey case (13 Ca1.2d 75) Drummey and Wilson 
had been duly licensed embalmers and the State Board of 
Funeral Directors and Embalmers ordered their licenses sus-
pended. This court lleld that it was dealing with a statute 
which conferred certain fact-finding powers on a board exer-
cising statewide jurisdiction and that there was no "indica-
tion that the legislature intended the facts so found to be 
binding on the courts"; that no method of review was pro-
vided in the statute. We held that we could see no escape 
from the conclusion that in such a proceeding the court to 
which the application for mandate is made must weigh the 
evidence, and exercise its independent judgment on the facts 
as well as the law, if the eomplaining party is to be accorded 
his constitutional rights und~r the state and federal Constitu-
tions. "The state constitutional provision discussed, supra, 
prohibits the conferring of judicial power on such administra-
tive boards" (p. 84). 
In Laisne v. California State Board of Optometry, supra, 
the California State Board of Optometry had revoked Laisne's 
certificate of registration to practice optometry in this state. 
We held there that "On the authority of the Drummey case 
the only type of review that would afford appellant his full 
constitutional rights would be a complete trial de novo as 
outlined in the decision in that case." (P. 843.) 
In Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, the State 
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Board of Medical Examiners revoked the license of Dr. Moran 
to practice medicine in this state. We held "That the trial 
court in this case was 'authorized by law to exercise its in-
dependent judgment on the evidence' is well established. 
(See Dare v. Board of Medical Examiners (1943), 21 Ca1.2d 
.. 
790, 795 [136 P.2d 304] ; Sipper v. Urban (1943), 22 Ca1.2d 
138, 141 [137 P.2d 425] ; Hohreiter v. Garrison (1947), 81 
Cal.App.2d 384, 402 [184 P.2d 323].) As stated in the last 
cited case, at page 402, 'Thus, the ultimate power of decision 
rests with the trial court.'" (P. 308.) 
In Thomas v. Oalifornia Emp. Stab. Oom., 39 Ca1.2d 501 
[247 P.2d 561], it was held that unemployment benefits pro-
vided for by the Unemployment Insurance Act were such 
property rights as to fall within the rule that persons deprived 
of property rights by a statutory administrative agency were 
entitled to a limite<l trial de novo in the superior court. 
Respondents' position (which has been adopted in toto by 
the majority opinion) is that the "Order" of the commis-
sioner was merely a "permit" which allowed mutualization 
if the policyholders so voted (§ 11526, subd. (d)) and that 
the order did not deprive anyone of vested property rights. 
We have heretofore held (Thomas v. Oalifornia Emp. Stab. 
Oom., 39 Ca1.2d 501, 504 [247 P.2d 561] ; Laisne v. Oalifornia 
State Board of Optometr'lj, 19 Cal.2d 831 [123 P.2d 457]; 
Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Cal.2d 301, 308 
[196 P.2d 20] ; Drummey v. State Board of Funeral Directors 
&- Embalmers, 13 Ca1.2d 75 [87 P.2d 848]) that where an 
existing property right is extinguished by the questioned ad- . 
ministrative order the one so deprived is entitled to a trial 
de novo in the superior court. Appellants here are the bene-
ficial owners of the stock of the new company which is held 
by the voting trustees for their benefit. Under the proposed 
mutualization plan, this stock will be nonexisteut and they 
will be forced to accept a price therefor, as well as terms, 
over whieh they have exercised no control. Mr. Justice Tray-
nor has pointed out that if the proper procedure had been 
followed, the rights of these people would have been pro-
tected by a court of law, rath('r than subjected to the action 
of one man acting in three irreconcilable positions. The 
assets of old company were transferred to new company 
in exchange for all the stock of new company which, in the 
beginning, was held by the commissioner, as conservator for 
the benefit of the creditors, policyholders, and stocl\:holders of 
old company (Oaminetti v. Pac·ific Mut. L. Ins. 00.,22 Cal.2d 
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344, 351 [139 P.2d 908]). Later, the stock of new company 
was transferred to voting trustees who held legal title thereto, 
" ... with the power to exercise all the rights of ownership. 
The commissioner, however, retains the entire beneficial in-
terest for the benefit of creditors of the old company and 
others interested." (22 Cal.2d, at page 357.) As stated by 
the insurance commissioner in his opinion and decision (page 
7 of the exhibit) : "Greatly epitomized, the plan [of mutualiza-
tion] determined that both the Participating and Non-Par-
ticipating Life Departments of the company should be mu-
tualized by the purchase and cancellation of all of the out-
standing shares of capital stock of the New Company, thus 
converting the New Company into a non-stock insurer con-
ducted for the benefit of its members who shall be the policy. 
holders of the participating and non-participating life 
classes. " Inasmuch as purchase and cancellation of the stock 
of new company will be accomplished by the proposed mutu-
alization, it appears that appellants have been deprived, by 
the order, of their vested beneficial ownership of that stock 
so as to entitle them to a trial de novo within the rule of the 
cited cases. 
The majority opinion states: "The approval of the mu-
tualization plan by the commissioner did not involve any 
deprivation of property rights or vested rights; it was in 
essence a permit or license authorizing the new company to 
purchase its own stock." This would be true if new company 
members owned their own stock (and therein lies the fallacy 
in calling new company a solvent corporation with all that 
term connotes). But the matter is not quite so simple. All 
the beneficial ownership, which is the real ownership is held 
by the policyholders and stockholders of old company; all 
the legal title is held by the voting trustees (appointed by 
the commissioner) for the benefit of old company policy-
holders and stockholders. In other words, new company holds 
neither legal nor beneficial ownership of its stock, but through 
the medium of the mutualization plan is given the right to 
deprive the beneficial owners of their property in clear vio-
lation of the law as heretofore propounded by this court. 
We held in the Drummey case that we could see no escape 
from the conclusion that the court must weigh the evidence 
and exercise its independent judgment on the facts as well 
as the law, if the complaining party was to be accorded his 
constitutional rights under the state and federal Constitu-
tions. "The state constitutional provision discussed, snlpra, 
) 
) 
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prohibits the conferring of judicial power on such administra-
tive boards." 
In St. Joseph Stock Yards 00. v. United Btates, 298 U.S. 
38,52 [56 S.Ct. 720, 80 L.Ed. 1033], the court stated: "Legis-
lAtive agencies, with varying qualifications, work in a field 
peculiarly exposed to political demands. Some may be expert 
and impartial, others subservient. It is not difficult for 
them to observe the requirements of law in giving a hearing 
and receiving evidence. But to say that their findings of 
fact may be made conclusive where constitutitmal rights of 
liberty and property are involved, although the evidence 
clearly establishes that the findings are wrong and constitu-
tional rights have been invaded, is to place those rights at 
the mercy of administrative ()fficials and seriously to impair 
the security inherent in our judicial safeguards. That pros-
pect, with our multiplication of administrative agencies, is 
not one to be lightly regarded. It is said that we can retain 
judicial authority to examine the weight of evidence when 
the question concerns the right of personal liberty. But if 
this be so, it is not because we are privileged to perform our 
judicial duty in that case and for reasons of convenience to 
disregard it in others. The principle applies whe'l& rights 
either of persons or of property are protected by constitu-
tional restrictions. Under our system there is no warrant for 
the view that tha judicial power of a competent court can 
be circumscribed by any legislative arrangement designed to 
give effect to administrative action going beyond the limits 
of constitutional authority." (Emphasis added.) This case 
and t.his statement were relied upon by us in the Drummey 
case (supra, 13 Ca1.2d 75, 85) and no information has been 
presented to me to show that the rule there set forth has 
been in any way changed. No clearer case than this could 
possibly be found to illustrate the evils to be avoided. Old 
company stockholders and policyholders have been, and are, 
at the" mercy" of administrative officials; those officials may, 
during the last 10 years, have been either "expert and im-
partial" or "subservient." 
I have heretofore set forth at length the self-evident fact 
that appellants are possessed of vested property rights of 
which they are being deprived. In Ohio Valley Water 00. v. 
Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 r 40 S.Ct. 527, 64 L.Ed. 
908], it was held: "The order here involved prescribed a 
complete schedule of maximnm future rates and was legisla-
tive in character. Pre-ntis v. Atlantic Ooast Line R. 00., 211 
) 
) 
J 
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u.s. 210 [29 8.Ct. 67, 53 L.Ed. 150]; Lake Erie & W. R. 
00. v. State Public UtiUties 0O'J'n., 249 U.S. 422, 424 [39 S.Ct. 
345, 63 L.Ed. 684]. In all such cases, if the owner claims Clm-
f£sootilm of his property wiU result, the state must provide a 
fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial tri-
bunal for determination upon its oum independent judgment 
as to both law and facts: otherwise the order is void because 
in conflict with the due process clause, fourteenth amendment. 
Missouri Pac. By. 00. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340, 347 [33 S.Ct. 
961, 57 L.Ed. 1507]; Wadley Southern Ry. 00. v. Georgia, 
235 U.S. 651, 660, 661 [35 S.Ct. 214, 59 L.Ed. 405] ; Missouri 
v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. 00., 241 U.S. 533, 538 [36 S.Ct. 715, 
60 L.Ed. 1148] ; Oklaho'ma Operating 00. v. Love, 252 U.S. 
331 [40 8.Ct. 338, 64 L.Ed. 596]." (Emphasis added.) 
Appellants here complain bitterly because the mutual-
ization plan provides that the price to be paid for new com-
pany's stock (of which they are the beneficial owners) is 
$3,000,000 while that same amount was originally taken out 
of old company's funds to purchase new company '8 stock and, 
in addition, all the other assets of old company (over $200,-
000,000 in assets plus such intangibles as going agency or-
ganization and concern, good will, etc., "worth several mil-
lions of dollars" [Oarpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. 00., 10 
Ca1.2d 307, 325 (74 P.2d 761)]) were turned over to new com-
pany I It surely must be crystal clear to everyone who can 
think that such an outrageous confiscation of property with-
out due process of law has never before taken place in this 
state. 
EVIDENCE 
In the trial court the evidence consisted of all of the record 
of the proceedings before the insurance commissioner, con-
sisting of the reporter's daily transcript, the exhibits and 
the commissioner's decision. Appellants contend that they 
were prohibited from introducing evidence, or offering to 
do so, because of the rulings of the trial court; that no issues 
of fact were litigated; that the court ruled that it was not 
empowered to exercise its independent judgment on the evi-
dence taken before the commissioner. Respondents state that 
appellants were given leave to serve and file a motion and 
affidavits relative to the introduction of additional evidence 
and failed to do so. The memorandum opinion and order 
(July 2, 1951, Clk. Tr., 237-239) contains this statement: 
-"After a careful study of the briefs submitted and the au-
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thorities cited I have come to the conclusion that, so far as 
any matter of fact is concerned, this Court is limited to de-
termining whether or not the findings of the Commissioner 
are supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whoZ6 
• record, but that it is for this oourt to exercise its independent 
judgment in interpreting the RehabilitatWn. A.greement and 
in construing and applying section 11527 of the Insurance 
Code .... 
" I have come to the further conclusion that this Court 
cannot receive any additional evidence, but that upon proper 
showing may remand this matter to the CommjMioner to take 
further evidence and reconsider the case in the light of such 
evidence. . . ." 
Appellants point to the statements made by the trial judge 
on the settlement of findings that II I think it must be very 
evident if 1 .1w.d 1w.d this case to decide on a new question 
of fact my decision might have been the opposite" (emphasis 
added; page 766, Rep. Tr.) and "It [fixing the price] is 
very complex, and I think you are making it more complex. 
My finding was, and the basis of my determination was that 
they [the price determination committee] had a reasoned 
basis in fixing the price. That is the fact. If they had acted 
unreasonably then I would have had to set it aside. It was 
only because I could not convince myself that it was not a 
rational conclusion that they acted upon that I ever decided 
the case the way I did. Because 1 could 'Mt take the facts and 
arrive at the same conclusion~· 'Mt by a long shot. B'ut because 
1 did 'Mt feel tkat I could substitute my opinion for theirs, 
or substitute my opinion for the Oommissioner's, that is th, 
reason I arrived at tke conclusion that I did. But that is the 
crux of it. It is not the details that they took in. What you 
are entitled to find now is entirely evidentiary." (Emphasis 
added.) The inference from this is obvious-that had the in-
voluntary procedure been followed, the court would have 
withheld its approval because the plan did not protect the 
interests of those owning the beneficial interests. 
The just-quoted statement made by the trial court shows, 
without equivocation, that had there b€:'en a trial de novo 
his decision would have been contrary to that reached. His 
statement shows that he was convinced tha.t the weight of the 
evidence was with appellants but, believing himself limited 
by the substantial evidence rule, his conclusion was in favor 
of respondents. The only rational conclusion to be drawn from 
the faets of thia case is that appellanta were pOliiessea of • 
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vested property right and, therefore, should have been given 
a trial de novo in a judicial tnoundl provided by the state 
for the protection of private pro~erty rights. Because appel-
lants were not afforded a trial de novo they have been de-
prived of their property without the due process of law guar-
anteed to them by both the state and federal Constitutions. 
SUMMARY OF MAJOR POINTS 
(1) It is my opinion that the provisions of the Insurance 
Code relating to voluntary mutualization of solvent insurance 
companies were not applicable to new company. As I have 
heretofore pointed out, new company was organized because 
of the insolvency of old company and cannot be considered 
as a solvent company until the liabilities arising from the 
non-can policies have been paid or sufficient funds accumu-
lated to pay them. The voluntary mutualization provisions 
of the code in and of themselves show that they were intended 
by the Legislature to apply to not only a solvent company 
but to a company not so closely supervised by the commis-
sioner as the one here under consideration. The ordinary 
solvent company is not such a hybrid as we have in new 
company. In using the voluntary procedure, we have the 
commissioner, acting as conservator and beneficial owner of 
the stock of new company, agreeing to vote for the plan of 
mutualization as proposed by the price determination com-
mittee. As conservator. and beneficial owner of the stock of 
new company, he is supposed to be protecting the rights and 
interests of those in the position of appellants. When, as 
commissioner, he approves the proposed plan as fair and 
equitable, under the voluntary mutualization procedure, he is 
concerned with the fairness of the plan as it concerns those 
interested in new company. If the normal solvent company 
were being mutualized, the plan of mutualization would be 
proposed by the company itself. approved by its board of 
directors, adopted by a majority vote of its own shareholders, 
and then approved by the commissioner who, presumably, 
would not have seen the plan, or even heard of it, prior to 
the time it was presented to him for his approval as fair 
and equitable to those concerned-the shareholders and policy-
holders of the solvent company. 
The following statement is found in the majority opinion: 
"In numerous cases where the action of an administrative 
officer was necessary to prevent defeat of the statutory scheme, 
his participation has been upheld although the grounds for 
'-Cad • 
) 
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disqualification were much more serious than those raised 
here." (Emphasis added.) The author again assumes too 
much. He assumes that the "statutory scheme" was being 
carried out. On the contrary, the statutory scheme is being 
defeated. The entire scheme for rehabilitation of insolvent 
corporations, and the statutory protection of the interested 
! persons therein, is abrogated through the use of the procedure 
designed for mutualization of solvent corporations. 
(2) I am also of the opinion that Paragraph 20(a) of the 
rehabilitation agreement has never before been judicially 
determined and, therefore, its provisions are not res judicata 
of the present controversy. I have pointed out that there is 
a separability clause in the rehabilitation agreement and that 
nothing heretofore done by this, or an appellate court,. will 
be affected by a holding by this court that the parties may 
not validly contract to mutualize new company contrary to 
the applicable statutory provisions. 
(3) There should have been a trial de novo in the superior 
court where evidence relative to the proper method to be 
used by the price determination committee, or court-appointed 
appraisers, could have been introduced by both sides and a 
determination made by a judicial trier of fact. Both appel-
lants and respondents here devote many pages of their nu-
merous briefs to such material. Such methods are obviously 
matters for experts in the field of insurance and should' be 
the subject of testimony in the trial court. 
( 4) If, as I firmly believe, the procedure for involuntary 
mutualization of insolvent companies is the proper procedure, 
sections 1049, 1050, 1051 and 1052 of the Insurance Code 
contain detailed provisions for hearings and the appointment 
by the court of appraisers to appraise "the then outstanding 
shares of the capital stock of such insurer, without regard to 
any appr~ciation or depreciation arising out of said mutualiza-
tion plan as so approved or modified. Such appraisement shall 
fix the reasonable value of such shares of capital stock, in-
cluding the goodwill, if any, of such insurer, and shall state 
the value, if any, assigned to such goodwill; and if the 
appraisers shall have found that such insurer has no goodwill, 
such finding shall be stated. Such appraisement, when con-
firmed by said court, shall be final and conclusive." (§ 1051.) 
The use of the involuntary mutualization procedure for an 
insolvent company follows logically from the original pro-
ceeding under sections 1010 and 1011. It should be noted 
that section 1054 (still under the Insolvency and DelinquODCT 
) 
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sections) provides that: "Such insurer, after mutualization, 
shall be a continuation of the original insurer, and such mu-
tualization shall not affect existing suits, rights or contracts 
except as provided in said mutualization plan as approved. 
Such insurer, after mutualization, shall exercise all the rights 
and powers and perform all the duties conferred or imposed 
by law upon insurers writing the classes of insurance written 
by it, and to protect rights and contracts existing prior to 
mutualization, subject to the effect of said mutualization 
plan. " (Emphasis added.) 
We held in Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 10 Ca1.2d 
307, 334 [74 P.2d 761], that "reinsurance" was a contract 
by which one company (new company) takes over the in-
surance risks of another company (old company) and becomes 
substituted as an insurer in the place and stead of the original 
insurer. This holding is also the logical result of following 
the procedure outlined in the Insolvency and Delinquency 
division of the Insurance Code. 
From what Mr. Justice Traynor has said in his dissent 
and for the reasons heretofore set forth by me, the con-
clusion is inescapable that the judgment should be reversed. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur generally in the discussion, the 
reasoning and the conclusions of Mr. Justiee Carter. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied July 27, 
1955. Carter, .T., Traynor .• T., and S('hauer, J., were of the 
opinion that. the ,Petition should be "ranted. 
.~ 
